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ABSTRACT 
Munson, Steve. M.S. January 2000 Forestry 
Application of Accident Investigation Methods to Wildland Firefighting by Case Study 
Method (112 p.) 
Director: Ronald H. Wakimoto 
Wildland firefighting is an inherently risky occupation. Firefighter entrapments, 
burnovers, and fire related fatalities continue to occur on an annual basis throughout the 
United States. The purpose of this thesis was to identify, from USD A Forest Service 
recommendations, an accident investigation method that would be most applicable to 
wildland firefighting. The most applicable method(s) would best be able to pinpoint 
causal factors and identify areas where future occurrences could be reduced. 
This thesis examined a single event as a case study, the 1994 South Canyon Fire. 
Due to the volume of published material and its position as an extreme case, this fire was 
determined to be a suitable study. The South Canyon Fire was reinvestigated utilizing 
each of the U S Forest Service proposed methods. Wildland fire experts evaluated each 
method according to six criteria. This determined an overall ranking used to determine 
the applicable method(s). 
Results suggest that two methods, The Sequential Timing and Events Process 
(STEP) and Fault Tree Analysis were acceptable accident investigation techniques. Each 
method had strengths (and weaknesses) in distinct areas. The third evaluated method, 
Controls/Baniers Analysis was determined to be not as applicable to wildland firefighter 
entrapments. Used individually or as a composite/cross reference application, these two 
methods would be valuable tools in investigating wildland firefighter entrapments. 
Research indicates that a composite model that utilizes the strengths of each 
method would be the most valuable in determining the accident causal factors that once 
identified, would lead to reduced incidents/accidents in the future. It is recommended the 
future accident investigations should use both methods separately, in conjunction, and as 
a third composite method in order to revalidate thesis findings. In addition, this thesis 
identified the need to utilize a reliable, established accident investigation method for 
wildland firefighting entrapments. An applicable method would determine causal factors 
for near misses and accidents in order to track, mitigate, and identify areas in need of 
revision. These areas must be identified if future firefighter entrapments are to be 
reduced. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
GENERAL OVERVIEW 
Wildland firefighting is an often risky occupation. The buildup of wildland fuels from 
decades of fire suppression and disease/insect outbreaks has compounded the risk 
firefighters have traditionally encountered. The accumulation of dead timber has 
increased the available fuels and fires are becoming larger and more difficult to control. 
Increasing wildland/urban interface complexities and public demands for rural firefighter 
protection of property have added to the inherent risks. Since 1976, a study of published 
accident reports showed 1,589 firefighters have been entrapped by fire behavior related, 
life-threatening situations (Munson 1998). The National Wildfire Coordinating Group 
(in USDA 1995), a collaboration of the five U.S. federal firefighting agencies and States' 
representatives, defined an entrapment as; "A situation where personnel are unexpectedly 
caught in a fire behavior related life-threatening position where escape routes or safety 
zones are absent, inadequate, or have been compromised. An entrapment may or may not 
include deployment of a fire shelter". During the period 1976 to 1998, Munson's (1998) 
study showed 104 fatalities have occurred and a yearly average of 42 protective fire 
shelters deployed. The traditional risks to wildland firefighters have become more varied 
and complex as the incidents and accidents associated with those risks have increased. 
As the risks have increased and mishaps continued, the need to identify these risks 
and reduce firefighter exposure to those risks is paramount. But as Briscoe (1990) warns. 
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" if absolute safety is literally accepted as having priority, with no acceptance of risk, 
operation is not possible, for all activity involves some risk." This thesis suggests it is 
critical to improve accident investigations to better identify firefighter risks that can be 
accounted for and managed. An appropriate accident investigation system would identify 
the hazards; illuminate the areas needing revision, and track progress of preventative 
measures. From insights such as these management of acceptable, known risks can be 
aided that can lead to increased safety and effectiveness of firefighting resources. 
On July 6, 1994, 14 fatalities occurred on Storm King Mountain (The South 
Canyon Fire) in Colorado. This event was a primary catalyst for wildland firefighting 
agencies to reassess safety protocol throughout their respective organizations. It was 
determined that "fire agencies are not routinely collecting and analyzing 
data... (particularly) crucial near-miss information on the wide variety of risks inherent in 
firefighting" (USDA 1995). Wilson (1989) stated that the federal firefighting agencies 
have made substantial progress in areas of aviation, equipment technology, fire 
prevention, and suppression tactics. The less tangible, more difficult to determine factors 
have not had the same focus. Braun and Latapie (1995) mentioned that though we have 
made progress in these more tangible areas little has been researched in the firefighter 
environment of human and organizational factors. Federal firefighting agencies have 
looked at these more physically tangible, identifiable, and correctable areas for solutions 
to entrapments yet "fail to deal with a major cause of the fatalities (human error)" 
(Putnam 1995). It is clear that it is time for the federal agencies to introduce operational 
procedures that better elucidate those human contributing factors. This would be a critical 
first step in the documenting and investigation of causes. 
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In order to reduce or potentially eliminate the causes of accidents, investigations 
must identify the causal factors so that preventative measures can be instituted (Mansdorf 
1993). The National Safety Council (1984) defined an accident as "that occurrence in a 
sequence of events, which usually produces unintended injury, death, or property 
damage". The key elements in the definition were unintended results and effects. Perrow 
(1984) said that this distinguished accidents from willful harm, violations, and incidents 
(near misses or near serious).* As Reason suggests, violations are of particular interest, as 
they become an increasing factor in the involvement of accidents (Reason 1995). He adds 
that they are a deliberate deviation from safe operating procedures and "occur in a social 
context and involve motivational as well as cognitive factors". Figure 1 illustrates the 
relationship between accident generation, the ensuing investigative process, and the 
resulting prevention measures (Diehl 1991). The figure suggests the fundamental 
importance of documenting, investigating, and understanding near misses, hazards, and 
incidents, as well as accidents. It graphically depicts the process of learning from 
incidents and accidents by thorough investigations that identify the causal factors. Once 
these factors are identified, preventative measures can be instituted to reduce the chance 
of future occunences. Kenney (1993) illustrated this fundamental concept by suggesting 
that for every fatal accident there were 30 major accidents and 300 recordable incidents 
and some 30,000 unsafe actions or conditions. 
* Though violations can sometimes be considered as purposeful, their outcome was 
generally unintended. Thus recent research has included purposeful violations (with 
unin tended results) in a working definition of accidents (Reason 1995). 
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The application of this hierarchical concept to Munson's (1998) findings on firefighter 
accidents/incidents showed that for every firefighter fatality there were over 15 major 
accidents (entrapments). Munson further suggests that over 240 recordable incidents may 
have occuned, and that there might be over 24,000 unsafe actions and/or conditions that 
so unreported. The accident reports showed that these hazardous incidents were not 
routinely investigated or reported (Munson 1998). The closed loop concept of the 
accident cycle illustrated the need to investigate all incidents in order to circumvent the 
transition from near-miss incidents to major accidents and fatalities. The closed loop 
illustrates the circular pathway that proceeds from an accident to the investigative process 
to detennine the causes. Preventative measures are then instituted from the investigation 
findings until another "leak" in the safety program identifies another hazard, then 
incident or an accident occurs. The cycle repeats itself as loopholes found in the safety 
programs are identified, then mitigated, until another loophole is breeched and an 
unwanted, harmful accident occurs. The safety program is therefore a continuous 
ongoing process to reduce the harmful outcomes. Therefore in order to be proactive in 
accident/incident prevention an effective and comprehensive reporting and investigation 
program would have to be established and maintained. 
—lymwmmnt i 
Figure 1. Diagram illustrating the "closed loop" accident process of accident generation to investigation to 
preventative measures (Diehl 1991). 
JUSTIHCATION 
Accidents have been described as a process in which a perturbation "transforms a 
dynamically stable activity into unintended interacting changes of state with a harmful 
outcome" (Hendrick and Benner 1987). Thus a homeostatic process was interrupted by a 
disruption that when unimpeded by barriers/controls or subsequent recovery efforts 
resulted in unintended harm to people or property. There are many reasons to investigate 
accidents such as faultfinding, fact-finding, the need to evaluate current safety programs 
and to monitor prospective changes (Ferry 1988). However, the major focus of all 
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accident investigations is to identify where safeguards failed so that recurrence of the 
accident can be prevented. 
"The wildfire suppression organization is inherently complex, both through its 
internal structure and the dynamic nature of its configuration as it changes to meet the 
variable complexities of the environment in which it functions"(0'Brien 1997). This 
inherent complexity, the dynamic environment of wildland firefighting, and low-level 
worker autonomy, exemplified the need for a specific accident investigation method that 
incorporated the variable components unique to the profession. The variability of the 
wildland firefighting environment and the complexities that are routine make this 
profession dynamic and challenging. The structure of the front line firefighting 
community is one of responsibility and accountability at the bottom where the fire 
suppression work is accomplished. Thus the low-level firefighters perform autonomously 
in an environment they sometimes may not be equipped to handle safely. 
As a direct result of the 1994 South Canyon Fire, the five federal wildland 
firefighting agencies commissioned a study by TriData Corporation (1998). This study 
was to identify firefighter safety culture and concerns by conducting a survey of over 
1,000 wildland firefighters. The study's goal was to investigate the underlying 
organizational culture that negatively affected firefighters' safety. The questions that 
were developed were used to generate insights into how firefighters did their jobs and 
how their beliefs influenced how they safely performed. It did not attempt to investigate 
the five national firefighting organizations themselves but focused on the underlying 
firefighter safety culture. Of the 86 recommendations listed in the study, the fourth and 
fifth highest priorities were directly related to wildland firefighter accident investigations. 
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These priorities were determined by responses from firefighters to the survey The fourth 
priority recommendation was that "the five agencies should strive to obtain a clear, 
quantitative picture of the pattern of safety incidents, their causes, trends, and the lessons 
learned; and to identify potential problems at the earliest time possible." The fifth priority 
was to "define interagency protocols for the process and substance of investigations." 
The final report of the Interagency Management Review Team (EMRT 1995) on 
the South Canyon fire recommended "the USDA and DOI develop improved, 
coordinated accident investigation procedures" (IMRT 1995). 
Ted Putnam (1995), a member of the South Canyon Fire investigative team, 
cautioned that the more tangible aspects, such as fire behavior, weather forecasting, and 
fuels inventories received the primary focus by the team and that psychological and 
sociological perspectives were dismissed as unimportant as possible causative factors. 
Team members had expertise in fire environment factors and not in issues pertaining to 
the firefighters themselves. He added that the review team's focus "fails to deal with a 
major cause of the fatalities (human error).. .and calls into question the very process and 
structure by which we investigate fatalities and communicate the results to the fire 
community " Putnam stressed that human and organizational error in recent wildland 
firefighter accidents and fatalities were common denominators and their study was 
overdue. 
Previously the National Wildfire Coordinating Group (1980) formed an ad hoc 
committee to look at firefighter entrapments and fatalities and concluded that since the 
1950's many of the same factors that were in place then as causes were still applicable. 
Factors such as fire behavior, firefighter qualifications, and communications were cited 
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as recurring problems. Therefore these factors were featured highly in reports. But it was 
noted that these factors were continually the major focus of committee's inquiry. More in 
depth and difficult to quantify issues such as organizational, sociological, and 
psychological factors were not identified and investigated as causal factors. Lucas (1991) 
offered insight into firefighting organization's search for accident causes when she wrote, 
"The search for patterns of causes is dependent to a great extent 
on the underlying perception of the causes of accidents and human 
failures held by an organization. This model of accidents and errors is a 
key element of an organization's "collective memory" and of its 
prevailing safety culture." 
Thus there is a need for investigative procedures that circumvent this circular, self-
protecting logic. Hendrick and Benner (1987) reported that repetitive accidents should be 
recognized as an indication of an inadequate investigation process that has failed to 
identify, evaluate, or act upon the relevant underlying causal factors. 
Ferry (1988), in reviewing a variety of industrial accidents, mentioned 20 major 
accident investigation methods but found no one method universally accepted. The 
specific application and inherent deficiencies of each model have resulted in no 
nationally accepted method for accident investigation (Hendrick and Benner 1987). 
Recent national scale investigations such as the Challenger mishap have failed to identify 
environmental/organizational factors using the traditional predictive analysis (Vaughan 
1996a). This may have resulted from agencies having embraced accident analytical 
techniques on the basis of perceived potency, current popularity, and agency investigator 
preferences, rather "than on the basis of their worth at dealing meaningfully with the real 
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technical issues at hand" (Clemens 1993). The inability to have obtained a universally 
accepted model for all accident investigations, in addition to determining a wildland fire 
investigative model that identifies possible human and organizational error, has drawn 
attention to the current need. 
Although many risks and hazards are associated with wildland firefighting (falling 
trees, rolling rocks, sprained ankles, etc...), this study focused exclusively on each 
method's applicability to wildland fire entrapment investigations. They were not only the 
most publicly visible accidents but by definition, the cause of entrapments, burn fatalities, 
burns injuries, and fire shelter deployments (NWCG 1997). 
Currently the analytical techniques used in wildland firefighting accident 
investigations have deficiencies that have not been completely addressed. This study has 
undertaken the inquiry into an accident investigation method that can be applied to 
wildland firefighter incidents/accidents and is best in identifying the major physical 
causal factors, vectors for human error, and latent organizational causative factors within 
the system. 
CHAPTER 2 
GOALS AND OBJECTIVES 
The purpose of this thesis is to identify a comprehensive, easily utilized, and 
systematic accident investigation method derived from US Forest Service (1998) 
recommendations that could determine most causal factors that have led to wildland 
firefighter fire burnover accidents (entrapments). The goal was to define a method that 
identified causal factors. Once identified, these factors would be addressed to prevent 
future accidents, reduce risk and hazard, and monitor safety programs. This method 
should be; 1) directly applicable in the field environment with a minimum of formal 
instruction, 2) required to be objective, proceduralized, and systematic to reduce or 
eliminate investigator bias and subjective analysis, 3) discipline the investigator and 
promote logical interpretation by others, and 4) reliable (testable) and document the 
accident process and identify any gaps in knowledge discovered in the investigation. The 
hypothesis of this thesis is that one of the three accident investigation methods derived 
from current USD A Forest Service recommendations would be the most applicable to 
wildland firefighting incidents/accidents using the proposed evaluation methodology. The 
investigation methods would each be used to evaluate the 1994 South Canyon Fire and 
the twelve "West Flank Group" fatalities and assigned ratings as to their overall ability to 
meet the proposed criteria. This will be the initial test of the selected accident method 
proposed for future wildland firefighting entrapments. Subsequent direct application to 
ongoing accidents/incidents would increase the validity and reliability of the proposed 
method. 
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CHAPTER 3 
PREVIOUS WORK AND PRESENT OUTLOOK 
ACCIDENT METHODS OVERVIEW 
Accident investigation methods have developed significantly throughout the 
industrial age into the "age of the organizational accident" (Reason, 1990). As 
technologies advanced and systems became more complex, many disciplines have 
researched the sources of human, machine, and organizational failures that have led to 
accidents. Engineers, economists, psychologists, sociologists, attorneys, insurance 
companies, and industry managers were among the most prominent disciplines to actively 
seek out causes of accidents. The realm of accident investigation research currently 
encompasses risk management, problem solving, decision-making, human error, 
organizational safety culture, safety systems, and other human, machine, and 
environmental interactions. As Kjellen (1987) remarked, "The development of the 
necessary means to reduce risk of accidents involves a multidisciplinary approach and a 
close cooperation between theory and practice." The integration of disciplines has 
facilitated a broader perspective and the ability to examine causative factors more 
accurately. This collaboration will remain essential to the ongoing search for the 
understanding and insights into the causes of accidents. 
The perceptions of accident causes have been categorized into five main areas 
according to their history, limitations, and applications. Figure 2 illustrates the various 
approaches to accident investigations. Three additional approaches to accident 
investigations will be presented following the five perceptions summary. They do not 
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meet the five previous categories criteria due to their investigative nature. These three 
approaches are Change Analysis, Managerial Failures approaches, and Multi-
faceted/proactive approaches. General overviews of the various methods will be included. 
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Figure 2. Diagram showing the dominant five perceptions of accident causation (Benner 1975). 
Single Event Concept 
Historv 
The first perception of accident causation is the single event concept. This 
concept focuses on the premise that accidents are caused by a single event. This simple 
model exemplifies the quest for the "cause" of what occurred. The search for a scapegoat 
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model exemplifies the quest for the "cause" of what occurred. The search for a scapegoat 
and taking care of the scapegoat would solve the problem. This concept is the most 
widely perceived and least complex. The public and media typically utilize this concept 
when they ask "what caused the accident?" 
Limitations 
The single events concept is limited in its ability to see the accident as a process 
or sequence of events in time. The factors that may contribute to the accident are not 
identified or pursued due to the fact that the "real" cause is obvious and visible. Causes 
that may underline human behavior are rarely determined. 
Application 
Current applications are primarily apparent in how the public and media view 
accidents. This viewpoint is reinforced by findings such as when an airline accident was 
caused by "pilot error". Police citations are another example of the perception. 
Chain of Events Concept 
History 
The chain of events concept or domino theory was originally developed by 
Heinrich (1941). The basic concept implied that accidents resulted from a sequence of 
events that led to an accident. Like a row of dominos, once the sequence began each 
event led to the next until an accident occurred. Intervention at any point along the events 
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sequence could halt the accident process and eliminate the unwanted results. An unsafe 
act starts the chain of events that began with an unsafe condition. 
Limitations 
This concept is limited by the linear progression characteristic of the model. 
Interactions among events, contributing causes, and the duration and timing of each event 
limit the identification of all causal factors. 
Applications 
The current use of this concept is prevalent in the legal field that attempts to 
reconstruct the sequence of events that led to the accident. 
Stochastic Events Concept 
History 
The prevailing idea behind this concept is the gathering of data and facts in order 
to isolate the factors not due to chance. The model searches for variables common to all 
accidents. This approach utilizes statistical comparisons to search for causal factors 
present in accidents. 
Limitations 
The Stochastic Events approach is limited by its dependency on the data reported 
by the accident investigators. The gathering of the facts supercedes any attempts at 
analysis. The validity is lacking in this procedure because of investigators assumptions 
about the cause bias the reporting of the facts. The procedure is undisciplined and 
unstructured. 
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Applications 
This concept is practiced to a large degree by the USD A Forest Service. A form is 
completed that has pre-identified contributing and causal factors to consider and record 
(see Appendix Table B.2). The "just the facts" approach is a commonly accepted way of 
investigating accidents in industry, law enforcement, and the medical profession. 
Branched Tree Perception 
History 
The development of the logic tree perception is illustrated by the following various 
accident investigation methods. The Management Oversight and Risk Tree approach 
encompassed several analytical techniques in a logic tree format as integral aspects of the 
investigative process. These techniques include Fault Tree analysis. The Haddon Matrix, 
Barriers Analysis, and Events and Causal Factors Charting. 
MANAGEMENT OVERSIGHT AND RISK TREE 
History 
Traditional accident investigations focused on the active response to a mishap and 
the identification of procedures to prevent future occurrences. The degree and intensity 
of the accident dictated the intensity of the investigation response and subsequent 
preventative action (Brown 1993). But as technology advanced and systems became 
more complex, the consequences of accidents became increasingly unacceptable to 
society and industi-y, particularly in the nuclear power industry. The nuclear industry and 
similar high-risk technologies have determined that learning from accidents and even 
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near misses was not an option. The consequences of accidents precluded the traditional 
trial by error approach where as accidents occurred the problem was fixed subsequent to 
the next mishap (termed the fly-fix-fly approach). A new approach was undertaken to 
become proactive as well as reactive in accident analysis techniques to determine 
possible failure points prior to occurrence. Johnson (1973a) working for the National 
Safety Council and under a contract from the US Atomic Energy Commission focused on 
a systems approach to accident analysis. This approach focused on the entire system in 
which accidents occurred and the interaction of events within that system. Johnson 
merged two basic views to focus on management responsibility in planning the context in 
which accidents occur. These views, understanding the energy release process and 
focusing management of that hazard on the route of its release, led Johnson to develop 
the concept of "less than adequate" management decisions. This progressed to the 
Management Oversight and Risk Tree (MORT) accident analysis tool. He said MORT 
was "an analytical procedure that provides a disciplined approach for finding the causes 
and contributing factors of mishaps". It entailed a very broad and detailed checklist that 
facilitated the search for safety problems. It incorporated 1500 possible causes and 98 
generic problems and was the initial methodology to embody management oversight into 
accident causation. The Department of Energy currently employs this method as one of 
its most comprehensive analytical techniques (DOE 1992). It is more generally used as a 
proactive method in safety system evaluations than as an accident investigation method. 
This is primarily due to the fact that it can be time consuming and intensive and due to 
the nature of the nuclear industry, identifying possible loopholes in the safety system to 
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eliminate hazards is more cost effective and publicly expedient than after the accident 
occurs. 
This concept was highly visible, easily reviewed and updated as new relevant 
facts warrant, and provided structure to help reduce overlooked factors and bias. Within 
the MORT system incidents were defined as inadequate barrier/controls or as failures 
without consequence. Accidents resulted in adverse consequences. The MORT system 
incoiporated the concept of the unwanted transfer of energy that can cause mishaps due 
to inadequate barriers/controls. These barriers and controls may be physical (protective 
clothing, concrete walls, etc...) or administrative (codes, standards and regulations). The 
MORT system is based on two main sources of accidental losses: 1) specific job 
oversights and omissions and 2) the management system factors that control the job 
(Johnson 1973a). A third source he mentioned was "assumed risk". Johnson noted that 
once this source was properly evaluated it could not be considered accidental in nature 
since we have consciously decided to accept the risk. Integral aspects of the MORT 
process are Fault Tree Analysis, Barriers Analysis and Event and Causal Factors 
Charting. Each of these approaches will be subsequently explained. 
Limitations 
Limitations of MORT are that it can be insufficient in finding specific causes as it 
designed to identify general causal areas (Gertman and Blackman 1994). These authors 
do recognize its strengths in identifying more specific control and managerial factors. 
Moreover, this systematic process is advantageous when system experts are not available. 
Application 
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Its current use as a proactive safety system analysis tool for the Department of 
Energy has long standing (Briscoe 1990). It has been used exclusively as both a proactive 
technique and an accident investigation method for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 
Fault Tree Analysis 
Fault Tree Analysis is a "branched tree" approach that uses Boolean logic to work 
backward from the accident event to identify causal factors. This technique is elaborated 
on in more depth in the Methods section as it is one of the USD A's proposed methods for 
accident investigations (USDA 1998). 
Haddon Matrix 
History 
Haddon (1968) was a medical doctor who introduced an epidemiological 
approach that is still currently used. It was a matrix of accident phases (pre-event, event, 
post event) and components (agents in the accident sequence) used to describe the 
accident sequence. Some investigators currently use the Haddon matrix to identify where 
effective interventions may be implemented in the accident sequence. 
Limitations 
This approach is limited by its inability to discover more deeply rooted causal 
factors. It is not as an intensive approach or as systematic as other methods. 
Application 
The most notable proponent of this approach is the National Institute for 
Occupational Safety and Health. They use a Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation 
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(FACE) protocol that is based on the Haddon Matrix (Casini 1998 personal 
communication). 
Barriers Analysis 
Barriers Analysis is an accident investigation method that is an additional 
component of the MORT process. The method identifies barriers/controls that are in 
place to prevent accidents. These barriers may be physical and/or administrative and must 
be absent, inadequate, or bypassed in order for the accident to occur. A more detailed 
account of this approach will be undertaken in the methods section as this method is one 
of the USD A proposed investigative tools (USDA 1998). 
Events and Causal Factors Charting 
History 
Events and Causal Factors Charting (ECFC) graphically depicted a mishap from 
beginning to end and showed the relationship between related causal factors and 
conditions that influenced the accident sequence (Buys and Clark 1995). In the mid 
1950's the National Safety Council developed "Dynamics of Home Accidents" in an 
attempt to illustrate the multifactoral aspects of accidents (Johnson, 1973b). Figure 3 
shows the suggested sequence of factors involved, including human factors, 
environmental factors, and mitigating factors. 
Limitations 
Johnson recognized the limitations of this model in that its simplicity failed to 
recognize organizational and industrial situations. He added that these situations were 
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more complex and had many additional factors that were inherent in those systems. 
Though relatively simple as an accident process model, the diagram was a significant 
contribution to accident cause analysis and became a prototype for events chain. It 
provided a systematic, standardized approach that disciplined and organized the 
investigator and allowed for logical, critical review of the investigation process. Events 
and Causal Factors Charting extended Johnson's work by illustrating the proceed/follow 
approach that characterizes the technique in addition to the systemic and contributing 
factors (Figure 4). Figure 5 illustrates how this concept could be applied to wildland 
fire fighting and the example of a firefighter receiving bums. Systemic and contributing 
factors could be incorporated so that organizational and managerial control factors could 
be linked and assessed. This addition was a major contribution to previous linear 
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Figure 3. National Safety Council (1984) diagram of the "home accident 
sequence and possible causal factors that can lead to an accident. 
investigation methods. Interactions and relationships between factors could be easily 
depicted and questioned if information was absent or questions arose. Multifaceted 
problems with long or complex causal factor chains could be better analyzed by this 
method (Gertman and Blackman 1994). This is because the accident sequence can be 
visibly outlined and worked backward from the accident to reveal causal factors as they 
lead to and interact with, each other. Banner and his associates (in Ferry 1988), while 
working for the National Transportation Safety Board were innovators in the 
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development of sequence diagrams and the charting processes such as ECFC. The 
charting process visually allowed for evaluation of factors that sequentially led to an 
accident. 
Limitations 
Limitations of this method include the amount of time required to conduct the 
analysis and the need for investigator familiarity with the process in which the accident 
occurred (Gertman and Blackman 1994). The absence of a time scale to relate 
simultaneous events to each other is another limitation of the method. 
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Figure 4. Event and Causal Factors Charting (ECFC) diagram showing the integration of systematic factors 
with contributing factors leading to direct causal factors (Ferry 1988). 
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Firefighter 
Brush cured 
sufficiently to 
ignite 
could not move 
Unburned fuel 
Firefighter unaware 
between firefighter 
of fire hazards 
and fire 
Firefighter training 
less than adequate 
Brush flares up Firefighter 
burned 
Firefighter moves onto 
fireline 
Firefighter moves 
into area of cured, 
unburned brush 
Figure 5. Event and Causal Factors Charting diagram of an example of the accident sequence where a 
firefighter gets burned. 
Multilinear Methodologies 
MULTILINEAR EVENTS SEQUENCE (MES) 
History 
Hendrick and Benner (1987) developed a systems based multilinear sequence 
method (Figure 6) to accident investigations that sought to overcome the deficiencies that 
were inherent in earlier methods. Multilinear Events Sequencing (MES) was an analytical 
technique initially developed by Benner (1975) while working with the National 
Transportation Safety Board and a further development of Events and Causal Factors 
Charting. Figure 7 illustrates the MES method using a firefighter receiving burn injuries. 
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This approach incorporated a temporal consideration that recognized and accounted for 
multiple events by multiple actors (or agents) that previous methods failed to take into 
account. In addition, some of these events may have occurred simultaneously, this 
method provided a chronological validation and event comparison format. Thus this 
process provides the opportunity to discover possible unknown linking events, causes, 
and contributing factors. Benner (1977) remarked that this approach provided a "method 
for proving the hypothesis that differs from traditional, statistical, or experimental 
approaches of the scientific method" by illuminating areas that may not be directly linked 
in the causal sequence. There were two distinct differences of the MES technique that has 
built upon the work of Benner and associates' (in Ferry 1988). The first was the 
identification of the beginning and end of the accident sequence. The accident sequence 
began when a perturbation disturbed the homeostasis (therefore this method has been 
called the P-Theory in reference to a perturbation). When this stable flow of events was 
interrupted by external influences the possibility of a harmful outcome increased. 
Identification of the flow deviation from the normal harm-free process was necessary to 
accurately pinpoint the start of the accident sequence. Identifying the end of the sequence 
(the final damaging event) would allow the accident process boundaries to become 
established so that the entire flow of events could be framed. The full sequence could 
then be subdivided into individual events and causes. 
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Figure 6. Multilinear Events Sequence (MES) diagram showing the analysis process in 
reconstructing the accident sequence. Note the time scale at the bottom and the 
incorporation of simultaneous conditions and/or events (Benner 1975). 
Brush cured from 
underbuming, 
Firefighter 
burned 
Firefighter 
unsupervised and 
uninformed on hazards 
Brush flares 
burning fuels 
Firefighter sees area of Firefighter moves into 
area cf unburned 
Fire burns underneath dry 
bmsh 
1400 TIME 1430 
• 
Figure 7. Multilinear Events Sequence example illustrating accident process of firefighter 
receiving bums. 
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The second major contribution the MES process has embodied is a more 
distinct time frame than was present in antecedent linear models. The timeline has aided 
investigators by structuring the search for relevant factors and events. Newly discovered 
conditions or events could be easily tested and then inconsistencies and gaps in 
knowledge could be more readily determined. The Civil Aeronautics Board (1962) in the 
early 60's incorporated a time line when flight data recorders came into use. 
Limitations 
This method may be limited by its perceived complexity in developing the 
framework to process all the information gathered. Underlying human factors may also 
be more difficult to identify if experience in the relevant work tasks is limited. 
Application 
Currently the National Transportation Safety Board utilizes a similar concept as 
part of a hybrid approach. Their approach involves a quantitative assessment of 
engineering structures, the environment, and the time line analysis (Gertman and 
Blackman 1994). 
Additional Approaches 
There are various other approaches to accident investigations that deserve 
mention. These methods seek to determine causal factors in ways that preclude 
categorizing into the previous sections. A list and short explanation follows. 
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CHANGE ANALYSIS 
History 
The Rand Corporation (Ferry 1988) developed the concept of change analysis for 
the Air Force. Their concept was to identify change in a system that would normally 
operate without mishap. Something had to have changed to make the mishap possible. 
That is, a disturbance to a homeostatic process was the catalyst initiating the accident 
sequence. By comparing what changes occurred which resulted in a mishap to the normal 
accident free task, causal factors might be identified. Such change could be directional 
and exponential. It would be directional in that once change is initiated it would continue 
to proceed until another change occurred. It could be exponential in that once it was 
initiated the changes interact to compound the effects of mishaps. Figure 8 illustrates the 
basic concept central to Change Analysis. It is considered to be a relatively quick process 
for detecting obscure causes. 
Limitations 
An expert knowledge of normal systems operation was essential to the determination of 
changes that ultimately resulted in injury or loss. This method could become very 
involved when applied to complex processes (Ferry 1988). 
Application 
Though this approach is limited, it still is used by various private accident 
investigators as well as with the US Air Force. 
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Compare 
Set down 
differences 
Accident 
situation 
Comparable 
accident-free 
situation 
Analyze differences 
for effect on accident 
Integrate into 
investigation process 
Figure 8. Change analysis diagram depicting the concept and process that compares the pre-accident 
situation to the post-accident consequence. The process aids in determining the changes to the system that 
had to occur for an accident to be initiated. (Ammerman 1998). 
MANAGERIAL FAILURES APPROACHES 
History and General Overview 
Many prominent accident investigators have stated the position that accidents 
have their roots in managerial and organizational failures (Fine 1976, Weaver 1973, 
Grimaldi and Simonds 1984, Petersen 1975, Vaughan 1996a, 1996b). Fine (1976), for 
instance, summarized this concept when he stated, "all accidents and hazards are 
indicators of management failure." Vaughan (1996b) directly related that concept to the 
USD A Forest Service firefighting community when she said that they are politically 
vulnerable and the policy decisions that they make directly affect how operations are 
30 
done on the ground and how lower level employees make decisions. She concluded by 
saying "top decision makers are thus irrevocably responsible for safety." Just as with the 
Challenger disaster, the USD A Forest Service has had warning signs of potential danger 
latent within the organization prior to the South Canyon Fire. These latent conditions 
brought about the transition of seemingly small, minor decisions towards what was 
described as an "incremental descent into poor judgement" (Turner 1978). Reason (1991) 
used the medical term "resident pathogens" to describe latent conditions in an 
organization that may have laid dormant for years until a triggering mechanism broke 
through the system defenses and barriers to cause an accident. He emphasized that these 
resident pathogens could be identified with "adequate access and system knowledge." 
One of several investigation techniques that looked more deeply into management 
failures and their contribution to accidents was TOR, the Technic of Operations Review 
(Weaver 1973). TOR was developed for the Wausau Insurance Companies to identify 
management oversight and omissions. Findings from accident investigations were 
analyzed using a four-step process. The process led investigators through a work sheet of 
eight general categories. The investigative team was to identify a direct cause to initiate 
the process. They then followed the factors that contributed to the direct cause that the 
worksheet proposed. This identified possible contributing factors to the accident and 
investigators eliminated factors that did not apply. The sequential process was used to 
locate the potential problem areas within the organization. Weaver recognized that 
though simple to use, TOR required an objective mid-level management team to be 
effective at exposing organizational deficiencies. 
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Another systems approach to accident investigations that has directly implicated 
management failure was Fine's method (1976). While working for the Naval Surface 
Weapons Center, he had developed an approach based on the premise that for each causal 
factor identified in an investigation, the question needed to be asked, "Where did 
management fail?" His technique proposed fifteen possible management failures linked 
to each causal factor found in any mishap. Fine stipulated that expertise and sound 
judgement by the investigators was required in order to trace all the direct and indirect 
factors attributed to higher level management. 
MULTI-FACETED/PROACTIVE APPROACHES 
Root Cause Analysis 
Root Cause Analysis (Ammerman 1998) was a method that incorporated a 
process for determining a single cause. The process involved a step-by-step sequence of 
previously known investigation methods. The step-by-step process was provided to 
systematically direct the investigator through a series of analysis tools so that the 
strengths of each were utilized toward finding the root cause. These analysis methods 
were; 1) Task Analysis, 2) Change Analysis, and 3) Control Barrier Analysis, 4) Event 
and Causal Factors Charting, 5) Interview Techniques, and 6) Root Cause Analysis. 
Ammerman (1998) added that even though the goal was to find the root cause, this 
process also identified contributing causes. He defined root cause as a causal factor that, 
when eliminated, would prevent recurrence of that problem. A contributing cause may 
not have directly caused the mishap but was identified as needing corrective action. The 
Root Cause Analysis process built upon the sequence of analysis tools as a means to 
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document, systematically organize, and logically proceed through an investigation. The 
goal was to not only identify what happened, but why Ammerman (1998) stated that any 
undesirable event, including those involving equipment failures and human error could be 
evaluated in this manner. 
Human Reliability Assessment 
In the 1960's and 70's human factors specialists, while looking for the role and 
causes of accidents in the work process, advanced the concept of human error in accident 
causation theory. Scientists that have worked in the nuclear weapons production industry 
such as Altman (1970), Chapanis (1965) Christensen (1972), Rigby (1970), Rook (1962) 
and Swain (1963) focused their research on human reliability and the description of 
human behavior in terms of errors. They recognized the major role human error had in 
potential mishaps and worked toward identifying possible areas that could compromise 
the traditional "defense-in-depth" safety backup systems. Defense in depth is the multiple 
layered barriers in place for the protection of workers from hazards. 
Many proactive risk assessment techniques were developed and are still being 
updated and evaluated as to their relative effectiveness. These techniques were focused 
on the human-machine interface and identification and quantification of human actions 
on systems risk. Under the general heading of Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA), 
analysis techniques such as Human Reliability Assessment (HRA) and Human Error 
Identification (HEI) were major evaluation methods to assess potential risks to systems 
and the possible human contribution to that risk. Techniques such as Technique for 
Human ERror Prediction (THERP)(Swain and Gultman 1983), HAZard and OPerability 
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study (HAZOP)(Kletz 1974), Generic Error Modeling System (GEMS)(Reason 1987), 
Systematic Human Error Reduction and Prediction Approach (SHERPA)(Embry 1986) 
were just a few of the many prospective accident investigation methods to reduce risks 
and accident rates in complex technological industries. 
One method of accident analysis that was developed for the Department of 
Energy to identify human interactions within complex systems used a hierarchical tree 
format similar to MORT. Human SYStem interactions (HSYS)(Hill and others 1990) was 
a linear process based on input-action models. The process followed a sequential path to 
examine human performance factors in incident/accident occurrences. Errors could be 
classified according to these five steps; 1) input detection, 2) input understanding, 3) 
action selection 4) action planning, and 5) action execution. These five steps formed 
branches of the hierarchical tree and have aided in both prospective and retrospective 
analysis. Hill and the other investigators stated that incorporation of intra-group, inter-
group, and organizational aspects were still being developed using this approach. 
Analytical techniques such as HSYS that attempt to categorize human error types offer 
the opportunity to identify, track, and reduce mishaps rooted in human error. 
The following section details the USD A Forest Service proposed accident 
investigation methods that where highlighted in the previous sections. 
USDA FOREST SERVICE PROPOSED METHODS 
Prior to 1998 the National Wildfire Coordinating Group (NWCG) developed 
accident investigation policy for the five federal fire fighting agencies. A significant 
change in investigative techniques has occurred since the 1994 South Canyon Fire 
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investigation. The previous method involved a multi-methodological approach based on 
traditional methods, logical deduction, common sense, and expert judgement. The 
traditional analysis methods incorporated accident reconstruction, identification of unsafe 
acts and conditions, trial and error fixes, statistical inference (finding variables derived 
from data to determine probabilities of future occurrences), and trend forecasting (using 
historical data to predict trends). The South Canyon Fire investigation (USDA,USDI, 
AND USDC 1994) used a matrix approach (see Appendix Table B.2.) where 
predetermined criteria were categorized as to whether they were significant contributors 
to the accident, influenced the outcome, or were non-contributing (IMRT 1995). The 
criteria ranged from fire behavior factors, and equipment condition to personal factors 
such as training and fatigue. Every significant contributor is to have written 
documentation. These criteria were effective in recognizing possible causal and 
secondary factors but lacked the means to identify underlying human error (Putnam 
1995). Because this checklist approach only accounted for those items on the list, no 
possible human, cultural, or organizational factors were available for evaluation. 
In response to the South Canyon Fire, the USD A Forest Service (1998) has 
drafted new guidelines for the investigation of accidents. Based on US Army procedures 
(DA-PAM-385-40 and AR 385-40 1998), the process used a "3W" approach (Ricketson 
et al 1980). The "3W's" are what happened, why did it happen and what to do about it. 
Figure 9 illustrates the approach. Investigations focus on assessment of elements that 
revealed human, materiel, and environmental factors that caused or contributed to 
accidents. The premise behind the concept is that by finding the reasons why people 
make errors, materiel fails, and environmental conditions contribute to accidents, then 
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similar deficiencies can be identified and reduced. Subsequently, the Forest Service 
recommended four analysis techniques but none were specifically identified or suggested 
for wildland firefighter incidents/accidents. The Safety Management Mishap 
Investigation and Reports Guide (USDA Forest Service 1998) said that the basic premise 
was to examine "why the sequence of events happened in terms of task errors, materiel 
failures/malfunctions, and environmental factors." The four methods cited were Fault 
Tree Analysis, Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA), Energy Trace Hazard 
Identification (ETHI), and Sequentially Timing and Events Plotting (STEP). No 
explanation was given as to why these methods were selected as analysis techniques. 
WHAT WHY DID IT HAPPEN? 
HAPPENED? 
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(CAUSE INADEQUACIES/ROOT 
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Figure 9- The US Army and Department of Defense "3W's" approach to accident investigation, analysis, 
and prevention (PAM 385-40 1998). 
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Energy and Trace Hazard Analysis 
Energy and Trace Hazard Analysis is an integral aspect of the Management 
Oversight and Risk Tree process previously discussed. Gibson (1961) introduced the 
concept of energy flow and barriers in the classification of accident process. This 
concept focused on various vectors of potentially harmful energy sources (chemical, 
kinetic, electrical, and thermal) and the barriers provided to protect from their harmful 
effects (Figure 10). Identification of these barriers that have been compromised aided 
development of improved or additional defenses. Gibson's search into safety analysis 
looked for a more behavioral approach in that these barriers can be supervisory, 
managerial, or organizational/cultural as well as physical. He stressed that these barriers 
may have worker behavioral implications in that these non-physical barriers are less 
visible and easier to violate without immediate adverse consequences. Administrative 
barriers such as rules and regulations are much easier to transgress than physical barriers 
such as containment walls or wire insulation. Examples of administrative barriers present 
in the wildland firefighting profession are the 10 Standard Fire fighting Orders and 18 
Watch Out Situations (see Appendix Table B.2). Examples of physical barriers would be 
fire shelters and personal protective equipment, such as fire resistant clothing, hard hats, 
gloves, neck shrouds, and leather boots. But a physical barrier would include any 
boundary of thermal protection between the firefighter and the fire itself. 
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Figure 10. Barrier Analysis conceptual framework where barriers/controls prevent the unwanted 
transfer of energy from a hazard to a valued target. These barriers may be physical (protective 
clothing) or administrative(salety rules)(EG&G Idaho 1985). 
Haddon (1973) further developed the unwanted transfer of energy concept and its 
control by various measures or barriers. Again, sources of energy were derived from 
chemical, kinetic, electrical, and thermal vectors. He specified ten types of barriers to the 
accidental transfer of energy. These barriers are intended to: 
1 ) Prevent the marshaling of potential energy-do not produce or 
manufacture the energy (e.g. Prevent probabilities of fire ignitions). 
2) Reduce the amount of potential energy-voltages, fuel storage (e.g. 
Reduce fuels). 
3) Prevent the release of potential energy—strength of energy containment 
(e.g. Reduce fire probability under adverse weather conditions or 
increase separation distance of fire personnel). 
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4) Modify the rate of release of potential energy-slow down burning 
rate, speed (e.g. Cool fire with water, dirt). 
5) Separate in space and time the source of potential energy-electric 
lines out of reach, (e.g. Escape route to safety zone or indirect attack). 
6) Interpose material barriers from the potential energy-Insulation, 
guards, (e.g. Personal protective clothing). 
7) Modify shock concentration surfaces of the energy-Round off and 
make soft (Probably not applicable to bumover incidents). 
8) Strengthen the target of the potential energy—Earthquake-proof 
structures (e.g. Fire shelters). 
9) Limit the damage of potential energy—Prompt signals and action, 
sprinklers (e.g. Lookouts). 
10) Rehabilitate persons and objects that may come in contact with the 
potential energy (e.g. Discipline and/or retrain) 
An analysis of an accident sequence can be initiated by investigating a) the energy 
source(s) and their paths, b) the people or objects that are vulnerable to the unwanted 
energy flow, c) the baniers and controls that were designed to protect vulnerable people 
and objects, and finally, d) the precursor events of energy transfers and barrier failures 
that lead to the accident. The ten types of barriers outlined above show examples of their 
applicability to fire fighting operations. Barriers Analysis also allows safety personnel or 
investigators to examine the sequence of events/causes that may have led up to the 
accident. Am merman (1998) provided a worksheet to document and track accident 
consequences, barriers in place and the reasons for barrier failure in any accident where 
39 
there was loss of property or injury. The Department of Energy (1992) expanded on the 
barriers concept by implementing a six-step process that identified the barriers, found the 
ones that failed, identified how they failed, then why, where barriers may have prevented 
the accident and finally validated the findings from the information learned. This process 
was incorporated into this thesis and documented using DOE's recommended worksheet 
(see Appendix Table A.l). 
The Earner Analysis method is currently one aspect of the accident investigation 
process (and MORT process) utilized by the Department of Energy (Trost and Nertney 
1985, Buys and Clark 1995) and proposed by the USDA Forest Service (USDA Forest 
Service 1998). Though recommended, this method has not been utilized as of this date by 
the Forest Service. Though the concepts and processes are identical. Barriers Analysis is 
also called Energy Trace Hazard Identification, Control Barriers Analysis, and similar 
variations of those names. 
Barrier Analysis is limited by requiring investigators to have a good working 
knowledge of the task process in order to properly identify and evaluate barriers/controls 
and possible avenues of bairier penetration (Gertman and Blackman 1994). Since barriers 
may be administrative, managerial, and supervisory, as well as physical, a competent 
overall knowledge of the work process is essential. 
Fault Tree Analysis 
Heinrich (1941) developed the methodology that preceded and formed the 
basis for Fault Tree Analysis. He illustrated the linear sequence of factors in accident 
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causation by using a domino theory. The theory stated that a disturbance that caused any 
one of the five identified components of the sequence to fail would set off a chain-of-
events that led to an accident. The five in the sequence were 1 ) ancestry and social 
environment, 2) conditions and fault of person, 3) unsafe act, 4) unsafe condition and 5) 
injury. He showed that by intervention at any point along the sequence an accident/injury 
could be prevented. This theory has been modified and updated (Baker 1953, Marcum 
1978, Heinrich et al 1980), and has wide applicability in current automobile accident and 
law enforcement investigations. 
Similar linear sequence models such as Critical Path Analysis (CPA), Gantt 
Charts, and Program Evaluation Research Task (PERT), were initially used in the 1950's 
and 60's as planning tools (Lockyer 1964). Though many names were given to their 
process they were veiy similar in their goals and methods. They provided a graphical 
display of activities linked to events by arrows in order to plan complex projects. The 
process illustrated a tlow (path) from one task sequence to the next and incorporated time 
frames and interrelationships between tasks. Projects could then be analyzed by task, the 
amount of time needed for each segment and the relationship a task may have with 
another task. These methods offered an effective means of project planning, costs 
analysis, and time frame considerations by visually outlining the task process (Lockyer 
1964). These processes also provided the means to better understand the 
inteiTelationships between and among tasks. This logical depiction of process flow 
related directly to analyzing an accident sequence and the precursor events. 
In the 1960's Bell Laboratories expanded upon the linear chain of events concept 
through missile system safety. They arranged events in a flow chart that used a 
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proceed/follow logic pattern. Their concept, Fault Tree Analysis (Figure 11), is generally 
credited to Watson (1971). Figure 12 illustrates the fault tree concept as applied to a 
hypothetical accident where a wildland firefighter was burned. This analysis concept 
helped provide a sense of management by objectives by identifying unwanted events (the 
top event) and then systematically and sequentially determining the precursor events. The 
objective is the top event and the identification of the preceding causal factors aid in the 
management achievement of that objective. Watson's Fault Tree Analysis investigation 
methodology provided a visible, easily understood and defendable format (1971). The 
methodology extended the linear chain of events into a "branched events chains" concept 
through the use of "and/or" logic gates. It uses basic Boolean logic in a hierarchical tree 
format. Other Boolean terms such as "not" are not used in Fault Tree Analysis. For 
example, "C" can only occur when both "A" and "B" occur. If two or more events are 
required for a cause to happen then an "and" symbol is used. Another possibility is when 
only one of the factors need be present. For "C" to occur, then "A" or "B" occurred. If 
only one event of two or more are necessary then an "or" gate is used. The "top event" is 
the unwanted result of the accident and causal factors branch out below leading to it. The 
downward sequence is continued until the root causes are found or the tree cannot be 
further developed. This technique, according to Benner (1975), "contributed a powerful 
tool for the investigation of accidents - both historical and postulated." Accidents could 
be investigated or reinvestigated in the search for causal factors utilizing this method. It 
assisted in illuminating areas that may have previously been overlooked by other means. 
Numerous approaches to determining accident causal factor using "branched events 
chains" reflected the discipline of the investigations employing it; thus medical doctors 
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used an epidemiological approach (agent/host/environment), while psychologists focused 
on human factors. 
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Figure 11. Fault Tree diagram illustrating a typical failure process, symbols used, 
and the logic sequence leading to an undesired event, a dark room (in Ferry 1988). 
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Figure 12. Fault Tree diagram illustrating the deductive process using an example of a sequence of 
events in which a firefighter receives bums. 
One key limitation of Fault Tree Analysis is the inability to model time sequences 
that are concurrent and interactive (Hendrick and Benner 1987). Brown (1993) added that 
only one event could be analyzed at a time and thus primarily applicable to catastrophic 
events. Benner (1975) cited similar deficiencies, most notably that charting analysis 
methods focus on a single undesired event and provided no means to indicate the 
chronological relationships (and the subsequent concurrent interrelationships) of events. 
Another limitation is the restriction inherent in the method whereby causes must be either 
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successes or failures and degrees of each are not accounted for (Tulsiani and others 
1990). 
Sequential Timing And Events Plotting 
Evaluations of the multilinear systems safety approach have led to a procedure 
developed by Hendrick and Benner (1987). Multilinear systems approaches view 
accidents as multiple avenues of causal factors that react to previous factors and may 
interact with others throughout the system to ultimately lead to an accident. The 
Sequentially Timed and Events Plotting (STEP) procedure was a comprehensive 
approach to reconstructing an accident. It was based primarily on Events and Causal 
Factors Charting and Multilinear Events Sequencing previously cited. The key 
component of the accident reconstruction process was the STEP worksheet (see 
Appendix Figures A.3). The worksheet was the documentation that provided structure, 
visibility, and organization to data gathering and analysis. It illustrated the beginning and 
end of the accident sequence along columns that represented time. The rows of the 
worksheet listed the actors, either people or things, which acted to produce the harmful 
outcome. Each actor performed one action, termed an event, that when displayed along a 
timeline visually showed the interactions among actors and events. The process 
subsequently accommodated events that occurred at the same time. Each event was 
represented by a block diagram that displayed the time the event occurred, the 
information source, the actor and the action (Figure 13). These event building blocks 
allowed investigators to visually recreate the mental motion picture and determine gaps. 
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By performing three tests, the accuracy and validity of the entire worksheet could 
be assessed. Test number one is the column test to make sure the events sequence is 
accurate. Test two is the row test for completeness. The third test is the necessary and 
sufficient test to validate what events were necessary and sufficient to have caused the 
next event(s). These tests also helped investigators look for knowledge that may be 
lacking. This extended the cause and effect linear model into one that took into account 
contributing causes and conditions that occurred simultaneously. Interruptions and 
questionable cause and effect relationships could be more readily recognized and 
investigated than previous logic diagram techniques. 
The STEP concept was substantially based on the development of a "mental 
motion picture" of the accident sequence as a reconstructive tool. The building blocks of 
actors and their actions were the "frames" in which to recreate the "motion picture". 
Figure 14 illustrates the incorporation of building blocks onto the STEP worksheet in 
order to visualize the accident "motion picture". Hendrick and others (1987) proposed an 
additional benefit to the STEP methodology. They added that the identification and 
utilization of an applicable decision-making model along with concrete terminology to 
specifically classify human error would expand the capabilities of STEP. The decision 
making model could provide the basis for the development of a data base to track and 
analyze human error that was unique to an occupation, task, and industry. In this thesis, 
the STEP method is applied without the human error classification since it is currently 
unrefined. 
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TIME EVENT BEGAN DATA SOURCE 
EVENT LOCATION (CARD ) 
ACTOR ACTION 
EVENT DURATION 
REMARKS 
Figure 13. STEP CARD used to consolidate information used to reconstruct an accident sequence. 
(Hendrick and Benner 1987). 
EVENTS IN TIME... 
STEP Building 
Block (Actor 2) 
Figure 14. STEP Worksheet illustrating the placement of individual building blocks (of actors and 
events) their influence and interaction with one another, and relative sequence in time (Hendrick and 
Benner 1987). 
CHAPTER 4 
METHODS 
STUDY APPROACH 
The application of an accident investigation method to wildland firefighting was 
evaluated by examining a single case, a portion of the South Canyon Fire. Case studies 
have provided an established, valuable method of study. Yin (1989) stated that the case 
study is a "frequent mode of thesis and dissertation research in... psychology, sociology, 
political science, anthropology, history and economics". The frequent use of case studies 
is due to the fact that they allow close in-depth analysis and understanding of specific 
cases, aid in understanding unique realms of inquiry, and provide insight into cases that 
could not be duplicated experimentally. Reason (1990) has stated that when sufficient 
evidence regarding a single case is available, "we are able to study the interaction of the 
various causal factors over an extended time scale in a way that would be difficult to 
achieve by other means." This case study allows for an evaluation of an extreme incident 
that could not be replicated by experimental means. Reason added that case studies have 
taught us "disasters are veiy rarely the product of a single monumental blunder." He 
further states that human-made disasters are generally the result of accumulating, 
apparently negligible consequences that compound to contribute to the undesired result. 
In reference to this specific case study, Prineville Hot Shot Superintendent Tom Shepard 
(South Canyon Fire survivor) echoed Reason when he said, "There was a whole series of 
events and circumstances, a change in any one of those would have produced a different 
outcome"(Long and Hoover 1994). 
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Case studies, as applied to this thesis, involve the investigation into a single social 
phenomenon, in this study, the 1994 South Canyon fatality fire. Case studies can generate 
innovative new interpretations and concepts by selectively analyzing a single case 
(Feagin and others 1991). As laboratory experiments lend themselves to low-level 
generalizations, case studies can provide the means to generalize to theory (Yin 1989). 
This approach allows for a broader explanation of how cases that are deviant can provide 
insight into accident causation and investigative techniques. 
Yin (1989) mentioned four procedures in order to construct case studies. The first 
is asking the right question you would like answered, what is the theory you are 
attempting to clarify and investigate? Data collection is the second phase and must 
attempt to include as many sources as possible in order to triangulate (come at the 
important data for various sides). This provides construct validity to the research. Data 
analysis is the third phase and techniques such as pattern matching, explanation building, 
and a logic model are techniques used to establish a chain of evidence that provides 
validity to the researcher's conclusions. This phase provides internal validity. External 
validity is accomplished by entertaining rival explanations of the proposed hypothesis 
throughout the study. The last phase is the reporting of the findings and conclusions in 
which data in the form of tables, spreadsheets, statistical outputs, interviews, coded 
worksheets, etc. provide the evidence necessary to defend the conclusions. Reliability is 
established through the case study protocol developed in the research design phase. 
Three accident investigation methods were selected for evaluation. These methods 
are the "units of analysis". The method of investigation is under examination in this 
thesis, not the fire itself. As previously mentioned, three methods. Energy and Trace 
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Hazard Identification (also called Energy Trace Hazard Analysis, Control/Barrier 
Analysis or Barrier Analysis), Fault Tree Analysis and STEP were recommended by the 
US Forest Service as their newly established preferred methods (USDA Forest Service 
1998). Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) was a fourth recommended method 
but was not integrated into the thesis. This was due to its primary quantitative application 
to hardware component failure rates in systems (DOE 1992, USDA Forest Service 1998). 
That particular method utilizes experimentally derived rates of failure in various 
components to obtain an overall failure rate. Benner (1985) rated these three methods 
highest among 14 methods he evaluated from 17 federal agencies. Benner utilized 10 
criteria derived from OS HA statutes and policy to rate these methods. Five of these 
criteria were utilized in this thesis as Benner's other criteria were directly applicable to 
satisfying OSHA's mission and not directly to the accident methodology. Benner's 
additional criteria were, a) satisfying, b) functional, c) direct, d) noncausal, and e) 
definitive. Criteria utilized in this thesis were selected because they satisfied standard 
assessments of reliability and validation (Benner 1985, Feagin and others 1991). 
Benner's reasoning behind the high ratings was that they were focused on accident 
causation as a process where events occurred in a logical sequence. These "events 
process" methods showed the interactions between actors and events and the influence of 
contributing factors on the accident sequence. 
LIMITATIONS AND GENERALE ABILITY 
One caveat Reason (1990) mentioned is the limited information that is available 
from past accident investigations and the tendency of documentation to be "digitized" as 
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opposed to an original, more complex and continuous nature of "analog" events. Past 
accident reports lack the information that was potentially available. The broader, richer, 
and more complex possibilities of the original account can be compromised in the written 
foiTn. Though this thesis is constrained by this limitation, the systematic process of each 
method can not only identify contributing and causal factors but gaps in knowledge that 
need further inquiry. The identification of these gaps is a positive tool for improvement 
of future investigative procedures and could identify areas that a particular method takes 
into account or, conversely, fails to recognize. Thus the advantages and disadvantages of 
each method can be determined. One method may be more applicable to specific causal 
areas whereas another may be stronger in another. Determining the strengths and 
weaknesses of each method as applied to wildland firefighting entrapments could provide 
the theoretical framework for applications to subsequent accidents/incident 
investigations. The method determined most applicable would also provide possibilities 
for additional research to overcome any inadequacies inherent in that method. 
The reliability and validation procedures of this case study approach, as applied to 
wildland firefighter entrapments, was an important factor in selecting this method of 
analysis. Each method used has been previously utilized in various industries and was 
found to be valuable tools in accident cause determination (Benner 1985). Therefore they 
have been found valid and reliable in other high risk occupations. This thesis utilized 
inductive reasoning where specific observations lead to theory generalization. Yin (1989) 
stated that "case studies, like experiments, are generalizable to theoretical propositions, 
and not to populations or universes and... the investigator's goal is to expand and 
generalize theories (analytic generalization) and not to enumerate frequencies (statistical 
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generalization)". Just as statistics from experiments that were derived from population 
samples are generalized to a larger population, case studies can similarly generalize to a 
larger theory of the investigated process itself. As in any scientific experiment, 
replication of the results in other case studies can offer additional information and 
validation into the phenomenon studied. By examining an extreme case, generalizing to 
less complex, less extreme cases could be applicable, reliable, and valid. 
In addition, case studies can provide invaluable modes of understanding (Yin 
1989). Insights gained from their analysis can be incorporated into theories of error 
production. Case studies can expand on principles that "can reasonably be expected to 
reduce either the occurrence of errors or their damaging consequences" (Reason 1990). 
The study of individual cases can provide understanding into the breadth and scope of 
human performance capabilities that laboratory environments could not emulate. It would 
be impractical (and unethical) to attempt to replicate extreme circumstances that model 
the real world in a laboratory environment. The ability to investigate and learn from these 
extremes in human capabilities, high risk decision making processes, and problem 
solving under life threatening situations can only be studied in their complete context 
from case studies. 
CASE STUDY BACKGROUND 
Background knowledge of the South Canyon Fire studied in this thesis can 
provide insight into the work processes, complex interactions, and the accident sequence 
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itself. This is a general overview from the fire's inception to the time of the accident. A 
more complete account can be found in the published literature previously cited. 
This fatality fire provided the detailed, published documentation to compare and 
contrast the proposed methods of analysis. It was inarguably the most documented 
wildland firefighter fatality fire investigated up until that time. On July 2, 1994 seven 
miles west of Glenwood Springs, Colorado, lightning started the South Canyon Fire. Due 
to the large number of fires that burned on BLM's Grand Junction District at that time, 
the fire was monitored until July 4 when increased public concern and resource 
availability lead to the decision to begin suppression of the fire (IMRT 1994). Local 
resources made up of a seven-person BLM/ Forest Service crew arrived and began 
suppression activities early on July 5. This group was supervised by Butch Blanco who 
was designated the Incident Commander for the fire. Eight smokejumpers with Don 
Mackey as "jumper-in-charge" reinforced the local crew later that evening. When 
mechanical problems disabled their chainsaws the BLM/Forest Service crew hiked back 
down to Interstate 70 to do repairs and return the following morning. The smokejumper 
crew worked on the fire till early morning on the 6* when the rolling of burning logs and 
pine cones made line construction too hazardous in the dark. They continued line 
construction on the southeast flank after dawn (Figure 15). Later that morning, eight 
additional smokejumpers parachuted to the fire with jumper-in-charge Eric Hipke. Hipke 
turned over the jumper-in-charge responsibility to Dale Longanecker who then became a 
line scout. A helispot was cleared near the fire and transport by helicopter of the twenty 
members of the Prineville Interagency Hotshot Crew began. Superintendent Tom 
Shepard led the Hotshots. After a 0930 reconnaissance helicopter flight by Blanco and 
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Mackey was made to determine suppression tactics, Mackey instructed the smokejumpers 
to begin line construction down the west flank from the north. They refused the 
assignment due to the fire activity at that time, but when the 8 additional jumpers arrived, 
line construction began. They were reinforced by nine of the Prineville Hotshots upon 
their arrival at 12.30. After eating at the "Lunch Spot" at approximately 14:00, some 
smokejumpers worked to the south while the Prineville group of nine and several 
smokejumpers worked the West Flank. This group has been designated the "West Flank 
Group" (Butler et al 1998). The remaining Prineville Hotshots and the BLM/FS crew 
worked on the Main Ridge improving fireline and monitoring for spot fires. At 
approximately 15:20 that afternoon, a dry cold front passed the fire area producing 
increased winds and fire spread and intensity escalated. At 16:00 the fire had crossed the 
bottom of the west drainage and spread up the west side. The firefighters on the west 
flank were ordered "to get out of there" by Shepard (IMRT 1994, Butler and others 
1998). The fire then spotted back across to the east side beneath retreating firefighters on 
the west flank fireline. The fire moved uphill in dense Gam bel oak vegetation and 
overran firefighters attempting to escape up to the Main Ridge on the west flank. Of the 
forty-nine firefighters assigned to the fire, twelve perished on the west flank and two 
helitack personnel perished when they were overran northwest of the fire. A third group, 
called the Lunch Spot Ridge group (Butler et al 1998), deployed fire shelters and 
survived. A fourth group, called the Main Ridge group, escaped down the east drainage. 
An initial investigative report was published by the USD A, USDI, and USDC (1994) and 
followed up by two reports by the Incident Management Review Team (IMRT 
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1994,1995). The Occupational Safety and Health Administration also investigated the 
South Canyon Fire and published a report (OSHA 1995). 
If* . ; 
Figure 15. Photograph of South Canyon Fire area and selected points where major events 
occurred. Photograph by Jim Kautz USDA Forest Service. Top of photo is Southeast. 
Case Study Application 
This case study has investigated a major subunit of the South Canyon Fire, the 
twelve fatalities that occuned on the West Flank of the fire. It was selected due to its 
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the consequences (Butler et al 1998). The other three subunits were the "Main Ridge 
Group", the "Lunch Spot Group", and the "Helitack Group". Accident investigators and 
safety professionals have agreed that the difference between a near miss (or near serious) 
incident and an accident is mainly a matter of luck or adequate recovery efforts (whether 
intentional or not)(van der Schaff et al. 1991). Therefore by examination of the accident 
subunit the applicability of the resulting accident method to wildland firefighting 
incidents/accidents ranging from relatively minor fire burnovers to severe consequences 
may be transferable. When safety barriers are breeched in occupations where the risk may 
be high, numerous controls must be circumvented. When the consequences are extreme 
and complex (e.g. fatalities) then the most stringent barriers must be eluded in order for 
an accident to occur. Therefore less serious accidents (near misses, etc) which have 
violated less stringent controls can be investigated with corresponding success. 
Inferences drawn from an accident investigation method could be applied to the range of 
failures from near misses to fatality accidents. This thesis would be an "instance of a 
broader phenomenon, as part of a larger set of parallel instances." (Feagin et al 1991). 
ANALYSIS 
The following section outlines the operations used in evaluating the three 
investigation methods. This section illustrates the three methods of validation, construct, 
internal, and external, and the case study protocol as a means of reliability. This section 
includes the criteria selected to aid in determining the most applicable method and the 
operational procedures utilized. In addition, techniques were included to measure the 
consistency and reliability of the results. 
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Criteria and Procedures 
Criteria have been established in order to determine each method's applicability 
to wildland fire entrapment situations. These criteria were; is the method 1) realistic, 2) 
comprehensive, 3) systematic, 4) consistent, 5) visible, 6) simple and easy to learn? 
Criteria were derived from the only known source of accident investigation methods' 
evaluations (Benner 1985) and were adapted to this case study. The criteria will be used 
by independent judges to evaluate the three methods. The judges were given a copy of 
the methods section in this thesis in order to understand the procedures and criteria. 
These ideal criteria are defined as follows: 
1 ) Realistic - this method should produce a model that represents the sequential, 
concurrent, and interactive nature of the events flow. The model must also 
represent the events interaction with time. The model must also allow for the 
real-world representation of the events and the inherent risks involved in the work 
process. Does the method represent real people operating in the real world? In 
other words, does it have ecological validity? Does this method reconstruct the 
accident sequence as it would have had to occur, both in time and in space? 
2) Comprehensive - the method must provide for the identification of the 
beginning and end of the accident sequence. It must describe the entire accident 
sequence so that no gaps in understanding exist. Does this particular method 
appear to miss contributing and/or root causes to the accident or does it seem to 
allow for all factors (organizational, managerial, supervisory, environmental. 
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human factors) to be incorporated and analyzed? In other words does it have 
content validity? 
3) Systematic - the method must provide a logical, disciplined approach that 
allows for mutual support of all investigation members. As information becomes 
available to the accident investigation, does this method allow for easy 
incorporation into the ongoing inquiry? Is it an easy to follow, step-by-step 
approach, that forces investigators to maintain that approach and not deviate as 
facts become uncovered? Does it exhibit face validity? Does the method's 
approach reduce bias that may be introduced by the investigators? 
4) Consistent - the method must be consistent and testable based on all available 
information. If someone else were to utilize this method would they be able to 
produce the same results? Is it reliable? 
5) Visible - the method must discover and present events and interactions 
throughout the accident sequence that would be easy to comprehend for others 
and provide documentation as evidence. Gaps in the knowledge or understanding 
and any assumptions must be identified. The investigation process must be 
relevant and credible. When someone who knows nothing about the analysis 
method was to look over the analysis, they would find it easy to see how the 
results were obtained. Interpretation would be minimal for an uniformed person to 
understand the accident process. 
6) Easy to learn - Due to the fact that most investigators may not have had 
extensive formal accident investigation training, the method must be relatively 
easy to learn, understand, and implement without extensive formal training or 
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qualifications. Forest Service investigators are not primarily investigators but 
occupy other positions. The accident investigation method should be able to be 
learned in a training seminar of less than 1 week duration. This criterion may not 
be as critical to the evaluation of the "best" method as the other criteria because 
an overall best method may require more lengthy training. This criterion will be 
evaluated on equal standing with the other five and then eliminated from 
evaluation so as to better understand the implications. 
The judges utilized a ranking system of these six criteria and assigned a ranking 
of 0,1,or 2 to each criterion. They applied each set of criteria to evaluate each of the three 
methods. A "0" meant that they did not meet this criterion. A "1" meant that they 
addressed the criteria but not completely and improvement would be required. A "2" 
meant that they fully met the criteria. This rating is a summated scale. The narrow span 
of the scale was used to reduce indecisiveness on the part of the subject matter experts, 
since they were not accident investigation experts. The 3-point scale allowed them to be 
more exact in their determinations of how each method satisfied that particular criterion. 
The rating scale also follows Benner's (1985) approach in that until a more 
comprehensive scale is developed to better differentiate levels of compliance to the 
criterion, a more simple direct measurement scale is appropriate. This rating process 
limited the possible more precise evaluation of each method but provided a basis for 
determining accident investigation methods that would require further testing in field 
applications. Since each criterion is independent of the others no weighing factor was 
applied. Again this follows Benner's (1985) format he derived from government statute 
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and "did not conflict with one another." Each criterion was evaluated as having no more 
importance to determining an appropriate accident investigation method than another. 
Each was a valuable determinant to the overall assessment. 
Five subject matter experts evaluated the three analysis techniques by rating how 
well they satisfied each criterion. They examined the three methods utilized in the 
author's reinvestigation of the S. Canyon Fire. This was a purposeful sampling of 
occupational experts. Since no known list of these experts exists, they were chosen from 
the first available. These experts were not accident investigation experts but wildland 
firefighting experts. This was utilized to most accurately emulate real world situations 
where investigators may have some investigative experience but their primary occupation 
and training is not in these techniques. Each expert had at least fifteen years of wildland 
fire suppression experience and is at a minimum qualified at the Strike Team Leader 
level. The Forest Service considers experts as those who teach a particular subject, so the 
author's classification can be considered conservative. This definition of expert was 
developed by the author and is a source of author bias but reduced by the conservative 
definition. To reduce evaluator bias, none of the subject matter experts consulted or 
coordinated with each other in rating the methods. Preconceived impressions about the 
South Canyon Fire and its possible causes may have introduced evaluator bias into the 
ratings. Since they were evaluating the investigation methods and not the reinvestigation 
of the fire, bias should have been reduced. 
The author (also qualified as an expert) reinvestigated the South Canyon Fire 
using the three methods so that the Subject Matter Experts could see how the methods 
could be used. They then rated the each method using the criteria previously mentioned 
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and rating how well each method met those criteria. It was stressed that they were to 
evaluate the methods themselves and not how well I did used each method. The subject 
matter expert's evaluation package included a summary explanation of each proposed 
method compiled from the standard reference literature (DOE 1992, Ferry 1988, 
Hendrick and Benner 1987). The package also included the author's output worksheets of 
his reinvestigation of the South Canyon Fire (see Appendix Figures A.l, A.2, A.3, and 
Table A.l). A copy of the study approach along with the author's results of the 
reinvestigation using the three methods was included. The subject matter expert's 
familiarity and knowledge of the basics of the S. Canyon Fire was assumed. 
The overall totals for each accident investigation method were assessed to 
determine the best method. In addition, the degree of agreement among evaluators 
(interrater reliability) was utilized to assist in the determination of the most applicable 
method and each method's individual strengths according to each criterion. Comments by 
subject matter experts were solicited to obtain individual impressions and evaluations that 
may have not been covered in the assessment process. As no additional literature was 
found on the importance of the selected evaluation criteria towards accident investigation 
methods (and methodologies), the study used a variation of Benner's (1985) criteria, 
methods and equal-weight approach. No evaluator or criterion was given more weight 
than another. This aided in strengthening the internal validity. 
As a measure of the reliability between evaluators, percentage agreement was 
calculated. This was done to access the degree of reliability among scores assigned to 
each criterion. The higher the agreement the more valid the ratings are. Also an additional 
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measure was computed using the index of Perreault and Leigh (1989). Their index is 
computed using the following formula: 
Ir = {[(F/N) - l/k)][k/k - 1)] , where F is the frequency of agreements 
between the e valuators, N is the total number of judgements, and k is the number 
of categories. 
Multivariate techniques to interrelater reliability were not conducted as the number of 
evaluators and criteria were considered too small and would not constitute any 
meaningful insight. 
The case study analysis used the pattern matching logic to strengthen and 
validate the results (Yin 1989). By comparing patterns predicted for each method, that is, 
that they meet selected criteria and are applicable to wildland firefighting, and matching 
with the predicted patterns (that they fully meet, or not meet the criterion), evidence is 
accumulated in determination of a most applicable method. Yin stated that though 
empirically based, the comparison of patterns and their ability to coincide with 
established criteria can "strengthen its internal validity". The development of empirical, 
logically tested evidence would provide internal validation to the case study analysis 
process. 
As mentioned previously, this system of evaluating accidental investigation 
methods followed an earlier attempt by Benner (1985). He acknowledged the 
assumptions and bias inherent in such an evaluation. The systematic accident method 
process, documentation of each event sequence, and independent consultation of subject 
matter experts reduced the bias. The five evaluators had no prior experience with any 
accident investigation method so there was minimal pre-study bias as to which method 
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may be more applicable. Although the author used each method to reinvestigate the South 
Canyon fire, each evaluator was instructed to use the reinvestigation as a means to 
evaluate the methods and not to evaluate how well the author performed the analysis. The 
author is not an accident investigator, so the way the method can be used to investigate an 
accident is critical not the way the author used it. The experts were presented the tools to 
understand the process and application of each method, and the author's working 
example illustrating how it can be used. They were instructed to analyze how well each 
method did, and possibility could, fulfill each criterion. 
CHAPTER 5 
RESULTS 
The results of the subject matter experts' evaluations are presented in Table 1. 
The STEP accident investigation method received the highest overall rating with a score 
of 52 total out of a possible 60 (87%). The Fault Tree Analysis method received a rating 
of 51 (85%). The Control/Barriers Analysis method received a rating of 42 (70%). 
For each criterion evaluated by the experts, the STEP analysis method was rated 
highest along with Control/Barriers as the most realistic with a score of 9 out of a 
possible 10 (90%). It was rated as the most comprehensive (100%), most consistent 
(100%), and tied with Fault Tree Analysis as the easiest to use (90%). Fault Tree 
Analysis was rated as the most systematic method with a score of 12 (100%), the most 
visible (90%), and tied as the easiest to use (90%). Two of the evaluators rated Fault Tree 
Analysis highest in overall applicability across all criteria to wildland firefighter 
entrapments, two rated STEP highest, and one rated both STEP and Fault Tree Analysis 
as equal. No evaluator rated Control/Barrier Analysis highest. 
The majority of reliability indexes and percentage agreements calculated were 
acceptable within the limits prescribed by Perreault and Leigh (1989) and 
Kassarjian(1977). They reported that indexes above .85 were very good and below .80 
may require réévaluation. The total agreement among evaluators for STEP and the six 
criterion used to evaluate this method was 80% (0.84, Perreault and Leigh's (1989) 
reliability index). The Fault Tree Analysis method was 83% (0.86 reliability index). For 
the Control/Barriers method agreement was 75% (0.79 reliability index). The overall 
reliability of evaluator agreement for all three methods was 80% as a percentage and 0.84 
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when computed using the reliability index. These agreement indexes showed that 
consensus among evaluators as to their ratings was acceptable. 
In reference to each criterion evaluated, the Control/Barriers and STEP method 
were the highest rated and most agreed upon methods for being realistic. Fault Tree 
Analysis did not achieve an acceptable agreement index (.63). In evaluating 
comprehensiveness, the STEP method rated highest for both overall score (10) and 
agreement (1.0, PeiTeault and Leigh's reliability index) and the other two methods had 
high agreement on a value of "1" (addressed the criterion but needed improvement). In 
rating each method as systematic. Fault Tree Analysis rated highest in both score and 
agreement. Agreement was high that Control/Barriers rated a "1" in inadequately meeting 
that criterion. The STEP method did not receive an acceptable overall agreement index 
(.63). Consistency was highest using STEP with Fault Tree Analysis and Control/Barriers 
second. Agreement on the scores for all three methods was acceptable at above the .80 
level. Visibility was highest using Fault Tree Analysis and of acceptable agreement. 
Agreement was high that STEP and Control/Barriers were not adequately visible in their 
application. Both the STEP method and Fault Tree Analysis were rated equally high as to 
ease of use and evaluator agreement was high. Although it received a lower score than 
the other methods, there was not acceptable agreement that C/B was easy (or not easy) to 
use. When the criterion "easy to use" was eliminated from evaluation, overall percentage 
agreement scores were Fault Tree Analysis (84%), STEP (80%), and Control/Barriers 
(70%) and therefore did not alter the findings. 
Evaluator's comments were solicited as to the applicability of each method 
beyond what each criterion addressed. One evaluator liked the way Fault Tree Analysis 
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visually presented complex events and the way it showed accidents as a chain-of-events 
as opposed to a single random occurrence. Another commented on the way Fault Tree 
Analysis led backwards from the accident itself to logically uncover causes or reveal 
questions that may have been otherwise overlooked. They thought that this method might 
be better at uncovering managerial/administrative latent factors contributing to the 
incident than the other two methods. In contrast, one evaluator responded that the STEP 
method appeared more stringent in revealing underlying human causal factors. They 
commented that STEP (and Control/Barriers Analysis) provided an approach that was 
more likely to distinguish more abstract human factors from hard factual data 
considerations and therefore be better at raising questions into human error causes. The 
STEP method was cited by one evaluator as the approach that most visually displayed the 
actor/action sequence of events and identified knowledge gaps in the sequence. All 
evaluators expressed concern that Control/Barriers Analysis was inadequate in 
determining causal factors when applied to wildland firefighting. It had strengths in 
identifying needed and/or compromised barriers at an administrative level but the 
dynamic and highly variable aspect of the firefighting environment made its application 
to investigations inadequate. They commented that it did not appear to be an adequate 
tool to probe deeper into possible human error (and administrative/managerial 
oversights). The method was good at defining what control or barrier failed but not why it 
failed. 
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Table 1. Results of subject matter expert's evaluation of the three investigation methods, 
A score of "0" meant that the criterion was not met, a score of "1" meant that this 
accident method had the ability to meet that criterion with some improvement. A score of 
"2" meant that the criterion was fully met. Consult text for 
definitions. 
FAULT TREE 
Evaluator A B C D E 
Criteria Total Reliability % Agreement 
Realistic 1 1 2 2 2 8 0.63 60 
Comprehensive 1 1 2 1 1 6 0.84 80 
Systematic 2 2 2 2 2 10 1 100 
Consistent 2 2 1 2 2 9 0.84 80 
Visible 1 2 2 2 2 9 0.84 80 
Easy to use 2 2 1 2 2 9 0.84 80 
Total 9 10 10 11 11 
SCORE 51 
BA RRIERS 
Total Reliability % Agreement 
Realistic 2 2 1 2 2 9 0.84 80 
Comprehensive 1 1 0 1 1 4 0.84 80 
Systematic 1 2 1 1 1 7 0.84 80 
Consistent 1 2 2 2 2 9 0.84 80 
Visible 1 2 1 1 1 6 0.84 80 
Easy to use 1 2 2 1 1 7 0.63 60 
Total 7 11 7 8 8 
SCORE 42 
ST EP 
Total Reliability % Agreement 
Realistic 2 2 1 2 2 9 0.84 80 
Comprehensive 2 2 2 2 2 10 1 100 
Systematic 2 2 2 1 1 8 0.63 60 
Consistent 2 2 2 2 2 10 1 100 
Visible 1 2 1 1 1 8 0.84 80 
Easy to use 1 2 2 2 2 9 0.84 80 
Total 10 12 10 10 10 
SCORE 52 
TOTALS 0.84 80 
CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSIONS 
The results of this inquiry into an accident investigation method applicable to 
wildland firefighter entrapments showed the Sequential Timing and Events Plotting 
(STEP) method to be the most desirable method, followed very closely by Fault Tree 
Analysis. Both methods together met the majority of the goals and objectives of the 
thesis. The total overall scores obtained for both the STEP and Fault Tree Analysis 
methods showed the two methods are not likely significantly different. Both were rated 
higher overall than Control/Barriers Analysis. Each accident investigation method had its 
strengths and weaknesses as verified by the resulting evaluations of each criterion. 
The STEP method received the highest score and highest number of selected 
criteria that evaluators rated highest and in which they concurred. The criteria that the 
STEP method rated highest on (realism, comprehensiveness, consistency, and ease of 
use) showed this method to be the best investigation process in these areas. Therefore, 
overall, the most applicable method would be STEP. Fault Tree Analysis would be the 
most desirable method when accident investigators required a systematic process that was 
highly visible and easy to implement. 
APPLICATIONS 
Possible application could involve utilizing each method's strengths in 
combination to overcome the inadequacies found with each method. A possible co-
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method approach where STEP is initially used to develop the timeline with actors/actions 
and events, identify gaps in knowledge, and provide consistency. Fault Tree Analysis 
would then be incorporated to provide the systematic framework to logically sequence 
the causal factors, identify any knowledge gaps not uncovered by STEP, and allow for 
additional multi-investigator input to be utilized. The resulting analysis obtained from 
STEP and Fault Tree Analysis could then be visually displayed using the Fault Tree 
diagram to provide an easy to see accident event sequence that would be understandable 
and informative. Since both methods were evaluated as easy to use, a co-method 
approach could be relatively easy to implement. In addition, this approach could produce 
a valuable cross-check and verification approach for each method. 
An alternative approach to determining the most appropriate method would be to 
conduct investigations using both methods individually under a variety of entrapment 
circumstances to actively assess each method's capabilities in causal factor 
determination. This would further validate each method's applicability to wildland 
firefighting. 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
It may be desirable to research and develop a new integrated method that 
incorporated the strengths of STEP and FTA into a third more comprehensive method. 
Thus the weaknesses of each model could be accounted for (and the inherent biases of the 
author and subject matter experts) and eliminated to produce a method better suited to the 
unique, dynamic work environment of wildland firefighting. Current research into 
organizational/managerial and human factors involved in accident causation would need 
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to be incorporated into the new model. In order to identify those factors that lie at the root 
causes of accidents, an updated model should integrate research that focused on high 
reliability organizations (e.g. air traffic control or aircraft carrier operations), decision 
making models, risk management concepts (e.g. risk homeostasis), intentional standards 
violations, and human error mechanisms (See Rasmussen 1997 for research into these 
converging fields). These fields of research could combine various academic and safety 
professional disciplines into a singular, encompassing causation model that would more 
accurately and effectively reflect more deeply rooted failure mechanisms. 
Another alternative would be to investigate more thoroughly the possible 
application of Accident Fault Trees (AFT diagrams) to wildland firefighter entrapments. 
Love (in press) has extended the capabilities of traditional Fault Tree diagrams to include 
temporal properties, accident severity considerations, and possible interactions during the 
course of the accident. These enhancements account for the most significant shortfalls 
inherent in traditional Fault Tree Analysis. 
In hindsight it may be more effective to survey additional evaluators in order to 
accumulate more evidence as to the best method. It would be more insightful to have 
investigators who are experts with each method investigate entrapment fires and 
subsequently compare results. 
An additional criterion would also prove more informative in the evaluation. This 
criterion could be the practical utility of the method to wildland firefighter entrapments. 
This would allow the evaluators to provide input into the overall applicability. 
CHAPTER 7 
DISCUSSION 
Results of this thesis have shown the applicability of specific accident 
investigation methods to wildland firefighter entrapments. Subject matter experts have 
rated the Fault Tree Analysis and STEP method as the most applicable to this specific 
high risk work environment. STEP received the highest overall rating, the largest 
number of high rated criteria, and had acceptable evaluator consensus on all criteria 
except being systematic(face validity). Fault Tree Analysis was rated nearly as high and 
with the exception of being realistic (ecological validity), evaluators reached consensus. 
When "ease of use" was eliminated from the evaluation process (to determine whether 
that criterion affected the rating), results remained unchanged. Both Fault Tree Analysis 
and STEP scored a "9" for ease of use and evaluators acceptably agreed on the score. 
Fault Tree Analysis has limitations in representing sequential and simultaneous events 
along a time line. It also was limited in only portraying success/failure modes and not the 
vaiying degrees that are often the norm in human interactions. But its ability to 
systematically and logically solicit the cause of a particular event was its overall strength. 
The STEP process was not deemed as sound in that respect. The STEP method was 
determined to be a method that was valuable in organizing and collecting data at the 
onset of the investigation. It was valuable in its ability to follow actors and events along 
the causal chain and illuminate breaks in the sequence. It also illustrated possible 
interactions among actors and graphically depicted the accident process in an easy to 
follow and updateable format. The STEP method would be a powerful tool in the data 
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collection/developmental stage of an investigation. When followed up by a Fault Tree 
Analysis, any subsequent questions uncovered may be investigated. This second stage 
analysis could also provide validation or invalidation of the STEP procedure. Upon 
completion of the accident investigation, the visual display of the root causes, 
contributing factors, and chain-of-events would be in the hierarchical tree format used by 
Fault Tree Analysis. Any interested party could then see graphically the sequence of 
events that have led to the accident. The appropriate and responsible administrators could 
then have accurate focus points on which to mitigate hazards and institute corrective 
measures. By the application of both methods in concert, latent agency inadequacies, 
managerial omissions and oversights, and human factors issues would more likely be 
identified than by utilizing a single approach. 
INVESTIGATING NEAR MISSES 
The premise has been raised as to the critical need to investigate incidents that 
have not led to disaster, the near-misses (Lucas 1991, Reason 1991, Vaughan 1996b). 
This approach would identify the sequence of events that could have led to a disastrous 
result were it not for luck and/or extraordinary recovery efforts. Identification of adaptive 
processes, modes of recovery, and conditions at the boundary of near-miss versus 
harmful accident situations could be invaluable in proactive measures to prevent future 
occurrences. Rasmussen (1997) discussed this point when he said that individual workers 
navigate freely within a work system shaped by objectives and constraints 
(administrative, functional, safety related). He stated that a worker searches freely within 
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those boundaries "guided by process criteria such as work loads, cost effectiveness, risk 
of failure, joy of exploration, etc..Managers supply the "cost gradient" in which a 
worker searches to identify an "effort gradient". Therefore, in their search, a worker will 
systematically migrate toward the boundary of functionally acceptable performance, and 
when crossing the boundaiy is irreversible, an accident may result. In a dynamic work 
environment such as firefighting, many degrees of freedom exist where firefighters must 
continually validate boundaries and adapt to changes that may be frequent, rapid, and life 
threatening. Rasumssen (1990) said that removal of human errors cannot and should not 
be the goal of safety programs. He stated that " the ability to explore degrees of freedom 
should be supported and means of recovery from the effects of errors should be found." 
Through training (such as simulators), firefighters could subsequently learn better coping 
skills at critical boundaries and a more effective array of tools in which to successfully 
identify, adapt, and successfully recover from potentially hazardous situations. Agencies 
continue to add more rules to cover situations where disasters occur in an environment 
where all the conditions can never be known (Vaughan 1996b). Skills to avoid 
entrapments and assess risk at critical boundaries could provide alternatives to the 
addition of more rules that make completion of the job more difficult (Rasmussen 1997). 
At the managerial/administrative level, near-miss investigations would aid in locating 
those latent factors that may have lain dormant at various levels awaiting triggering 
actions that may result in an accident. Defenses, barriers, and safeguards within an 
organization can be circumvented when a particular combination of events occurs. 
Proactive identification of possible "loopholes" within the organization could aid in 
closing those gaps in the defenses through which accident sequences may occur. 
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The reporting, identification and subsequent investigation of near-miss incidents 
is the primary focus of the National Interagency Fire Center's (NIFC) SAFETYNET '99 
pilot program. This program responds to the Tri-Data report's recommendation (1998) to 
develop a system for anonymously reporting safety concerns. Another interagency 
response to Tri-Data's recommendations is the Center for Lessons Learned that is 
currently being developed at NIFC. This Center is a focal point and clearinghouse for 
information related to firefighter safety. Both the safety data reporting system and the 
Center for Lessons Learned are vital components of the study's principle "collect reliable 
safety data and use it". 
Lucas (1991) proposed "systemic safety management" whereby perceived 
potential problems, as well as near misses and accidents, are actively solicited from 
throughout the organization as an integral component of the organizational culture. She 
cited three key elements vital to the success of a systems approach. The employees must 
have anonymity and freedom from prosecution in reporting near misses. They must have 
confidence in management's policy of forgiveness so they have no fear in losing their 
jobs. And finally, there must be feedback to employees in the form of implemented error 
control strategies so that they can see the results of their input. Thus, it is critical that 
organizations objectively evaluate their underlying safety culture if they wish to institute 
a near miss reporting system and benefit from the results. 
In addition, by reducing the number of unsafe acts, agencies can reduce the 
number of harmful accidents. For every accident reported, there are numerous unsafe 
acts that were unreported (Reason 1991). This reduction of unsafe acts could be 
accomplished by clearly defining employee (firefighter) tasks, adequately teach them 
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how to do each task, validly measure performance of each task, and subsequently reward 
workers for high-quality completion of the assigned tasks (Kenney 1993). This is clearly 
a line management responsibility and function. These include, but are not limited to, 
safety, environmental, and risk management activities. Acquisition and allocation of 
resources, proper training, and stewardship programs are subsequently dependent on the 
decisions of top level managers and administrators (Vaughan 1996b, Kenney 1993). 
Another avenue of approach that can add more reliability and validity to accident 
investigations is one in which the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has a 
prominent role. As Johnson (1999) points out, the NTSB position is outside the Federal 
regulatory mechanisms that protect the agencies and companies that are investigated. 
Thus the Board has the independence and autonomy to analyze managerial and regulatory 
practices that may otherwise be overlooked. Any agency that investigates itself may very 
well be suspect in its conclusions (whether right or wrong), particularly when the agency 
itself may be lacking in adequate policy, regulations/standards, and oversight. As in 
previous wildland firefighter accident investigations, wider issues pertaining to 
organizational and administrative practices have been generally obscured by more 
prominent causal factors such as high workload, situational awareness, distributed 
cognition, and mode confusion (Johnson 1999). 
As environmental conditions change adversely, fire ground complexities increase, 
and agencies continue to be subject to changing political climates, a comprehensive, 
systematic process to reveal possible failure points is vital. Investigations of entrapment 
near-misses would provide the insight as to where the system needs reassessment and 
updated controls. It would likewise provide insight into the adaptive/coping skills that 
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may have kept a near-miss from becoming an accident. There is a need to learn from the 
lessons that occur without the resulting disaster so that firefighter safety is not so much 
reactive to major disasters but continually adapting to the dynamic nature of the overall 
work environment. Reason (1997) calls for an informed culture, one comprised of a 
reporting culture (accident/incident reporting), a just culture (where rewards and 
punishments are viewed as just), à flexible culture (where an organization shifts from a 
bureaucratic conventional operating mode to professional, task expert control during 
emergency situations), and finally a learning culture (where the organization has the 
willingness and competence to identify correct conclusions and implement needed 
reforms). Adequate investigations of near-miss incidents and the development of 
avoidance/coping skills at vital trigger points (boundaries) could greatly decrease the 
harmful outcomes to wildland firefighters. By identification of boundaries where 
successful recovery actions cannot be implemented and the necessary coping/recovery 
skills near these boundaries, harmful accidents could be significantly reduced. The STEP 
method used as a primary investigation tool and followed up by Fault Tree Analysis 
could greatly aid in the ongoing search for a safer firefighting work environment. Both 
methods offer the means to incorporate more abstract causative factors and more specific 
root causes as new "composite" error identification models become functional. 
This thesis showed, not only the two most applicable accident investigation 
methods for wildland firefighter entrapments, but the critical need for requiring a method 
to be utilized. In order to determine the proximate causes of entrapments, the trends, and 
monitoring of safety measures, it seems equally critical to develop the data base of 
human factors causes and near miss incidents. To develop and institute a safety culture 
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through a learning culture, a total commitment by management must be a leading 
priority. The current trend in firefighter entrapments can only be reduced by top level 
administrative support and low level firefighter dedication to safety A change in the way 
we do business, a change in the safety culture, can be and must be achieved by the 
combined efforts of all levels of the wildland firefighter community. 
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Figure A. 1 GENERAL OVERVIEW FOR EVALUATORS 
Enclosed; 
1. Overviews of each accident investigation method a) Fault Tree Analysis, b) Control/Barrier Analysis, 
c) STEP (Sequential Timing and Events Plotting). 
2. Results of the South Canyon case study analysis using the three methods. If the results seem 
incomplete and need something added, let me know.. .1 may have missed something in the analysis as I 
have had no one look it over. That doesn't necessarily mean the analysis method is faulty, just my 
work to produce the results! 
3. Study Approach copy with the evaluation criteria and rating procedures. Rate each method using the 6 
criteria (ranges 0 to 2). Therefore a method that hilly meets each criteria would have an overall rating 
of 12. The study approach has a brief history of the fire, the criteria and procedures I used and the 
scientific justification for using the case study approach (This part isn't necessary to read to do the 
evaluation). Enclose any additional comments or suggestions that may be helpful. Also if at any time 
there are questions about any area, call or e-mail me at the following; 
Steve Munson 
508 S. 3"^ W. #9 
Missoula, MT. 59801 
406-5423877 
smunson @bi^skv.net 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
Each criterion will have to be evaluated as to how it would apply to field investigations of wildland 
firefighter entrapments. Therefore, for example, for criteria #4(consistency), you need to assess if this 
method is repeatable if someone else had the same information, did it seem to be a logical method to 
determine all the causal factors involved? Remember that you are to evaluate each accident investigation 
method, not how well I did it, but what each method reveals as tar as contributing and causal factors. If one 
method does not look deep enough into a cause, then it may not be comprehensive enough, (but that 
method may be able to do that I just didn't pursue it far enough) that's my fault not the methods. 
Please return your results as soon as possible. All this needs to be is the number assigned to each 
criteria (i.e. Realistic-1, comprehensive-2) for each method...STEP, Fault Tree, and Control/Barriers. Also 
enclose any comments and suggestions you may have that would aid in making the study or technique(s) 
better. 
GENERAL COMMENTS ON EACH METHOD: 
Fault Tree Analysis—the top event is the undesired happening (getting burned over) work down 
the tree in steps to determine what caused the event above it. If two or more events are required then an 
''and" gate is required. If only one of a list of events is required then an "or" gate is necessary. Keep 
working down until you found the root cause or you don't have the information to go any farther. 
Control/Barriers Analysis—There are always barriers to protect us fi-om harm. When one or more 
fail then an accident can occur. These barriers can be physical (PPE) or administrative (Rules, guidelines, 
etc...) The idea is to define the barriers that protect firefighters from getting burned over, then assess which 
ones failed. 
STEP- The idea is to reproduce the accident sequence as a mental motion picture. You use blocks 
that define actors and their actions that together or alone interacted to produce an accident. Actors can be 
people or things (Fire is an actor). You place these blocks along a timeline to determine gaps, the accident 
flow, and the interaction between actors (and their actions). This gives a visual means to reproduce the 
accident and what caused what to happen and when. In this study an Excel worksheet was used to show all 
information available and the relevant actors along a timeline. The blocks were taken from that worksheet 
to produce a flow diagram that shows how the accident process occurred. 
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Figure A.2 FAULT TREE ANALYSIS 
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TABLE A. 1 
Barriers Worksheet 
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A B C D 
LL H
I 
G 
1 HAZARD 
DIRECT BARRIER 
OR CONTROL 
FAILURE 
KUt>SIULk 
CONTRIBUTING 
FACTORS TO 
BARRIER OR 
CONTROL 
FAILURES 
POSSIBLE ROOT 
CAUSES OF 
FAILURES 
LOSS OR 
POTENTIAL 
LOSS EVENT EVALUATION 
2 FIRE Safety Zone 
Inadequate 
escape routes to 
safety zone, 
warning received 
too late to reach 
safety zone, 
closere safety 
zones not 
established 
Fuel loadings high, 
fuel available to 
bum Injury or death 
Assumptions 
by firefighters 
that helicopter 
and personnel 
were adequate 
and fireline 
would be 
completed 
before cold 
front 
3 Fire Shelters 
Inadequate 
shelter 
deployment area, 
fire too intense 
for survivability 
Inadequate time to 
reach safety zone, 
inadequate 
separation 
Unsafe 
deployment 
zone 
4 
Personal Protective 
Equipment 
fire intensity too 
high, escape 
from fire too late 
Inadequate 
separation 
Fire intensity 
too high 
5 
Failure to follow 
Standards, Codes, 
and Regulations 
Group 
polarization, "can-
do" attitude, 
culture of 
violations, 
complacency 
Lack of 
enforcement, 
unclear/conflicting 
rules 
Aggressive 
direction and 
past viloations, 
mgmt. 
Direction 
leading to 
unsafe actions 
6 
Failure to receive 
adequate 
information/briefing 
raiiure oi lu 
and/or 
firefighters to ask 
and give 
information, 
Failure of 
Dispatch/coordin 
ating center to 
inform. 
Assumptions by IC 
about FF 
knowledge, 
previous briefings, 
fire behavior 
potential Dispatch 
over worked with 
many fires 
Lack of 
responsibility 
at Dispatch for 
briefing, Lack 
of IC/FF 
responsibility 
to give/receive 
information. 
7 
Failure to recognize 
and account for fire 
potential 
IC/Dispatch 
failed to brief on 
recent area fire 
behavior, FF's 
thought line 
would be done 
before 
approaching cold 
front, that 
enough 
resources were 
present, 
complacency 
from slow 
burning. 
Lack of adequate 
command /control, 
Assumptions and 
cultural pressure to 
do task with 
avilable 
resouces/info, 
Organizational/ 
managerial 
oversight and 
firefighter 
culture 
inadequate for 
task. 
Undspoken 
pressure to do 
task with 
resources/info 
received. 
8 
9 
10 
1 i 
91 
Figure A. 3 
STEP WORKSHEETS 
The following pages are the STEP development worksheets. They were constructed in a 
Microsoft Excel spreadsheet program and are made up of STEP building blocks (see 
Figures 13-14) along a timeline on the X (horizontal) axis. The Y (vertical) axis lists the 
actors (people, objects, things) in the accident sequence. These worksheets are placed so 
that they are read across to the final outcome and then drop down and read across again. 
The sources of information were abbreviated due to limited space. They are 1) FBA is for 
the fire behavior analysis done by Butler and others (1998) which includes Ted Putnam's 
time estimations, 2) SCR is for the original South Canyon Report (IMRT 1994, 1995), 
and the 3) OSHA report (1995) was also a source of information. 
TIME 300:00:00 5:28:00 08:00 to 09:00 9:30:00 10:27:00 11:15:00 11:30:00 
Actor 
FIRE 
SCR,Rhoades 
"Flre"burning 
actively 
SCR 
"Fire" produces 
smoke low in 
West drainage 
-SCR-
"Fire" runs 5ft. Strip from 
torched tree 40 yds down 
from ridge..causes spot fire 
across line, water drop and 
crew suppress. 
WIND 
SPOT FIRE(1)East 
SPOT FIRE(2)West 
WEST FLANK GROUP 
11:35:00 12:30:00 12:45:00 13:00:00 13:30:00 PM 14:00 PM 14:15 to 14:30 14:45:00 15:00:00 
Petrilli,Doehring 
"Fire" torches 
Tree 40yds. 
below Main 
Ridge, 5ft.wide 
run through oak 
SCR 
"Fire" flares up 
at 
Tree, .firefighters 
retreat 400ft. 
Then return 
when water 
drops effective. 
Scholz.Shepard 
"Fire" activity 
increases...Smoke 
low in 
canyon.Wind 
increases on Main 
Ridge 
SCR 
"Fire" 
burning as 
hot spots in 
double 
draws. 
Scholz-
"Wind" blows strong 
and gusty at Canyon 
Cr. 
Estates(1 Smph).. .front 
approaches 
-Scholz, 
Shepard-
"Wind" increases 
on Main 
Ridge...fire activity 
increases 
-Scholz-
"West Flank 
Group" 
meets at 
Stump...first 
time together 
SCR-
"West Flank Group" 
eats lunch with 
Jumpers at Lunch 
Spot 
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15:15:00 15:20:00 15:23:00 15:30:00 15:45:00 15:55:00 15:56:00 15:58:00 
SCR 
"Fire" activity 
picl<s up west 
of 
H1... reported 
by helibase 
SCR, 
Scholz,Erickson,Doehring 
"Fire" burning in litter... 
-Petrilli, 
Longanecker 
"Fire" activity 
continues 
south of 
Double 
Draws 
-SCR-
"Wind" 
squirrely at 
H-2...light 
at Zero Pt. 
Cold Front 
approaches 
Scholz-
"Wind" blows strong on 
Main Ridge...calm on 
West flank...picks up on 
Lunch Spot...sun breaks 
through 
Ryerson,Good,Shepard 
photo-
"Wind" blows at SSmph 
on Main Ridge and 
South of Lunch 
Spot...Calm on West 
flank 
Erickson.Doehring 
"Wind" calm on west flank 
-Good-
"Spot fires" 
burning in 
bottom of 
West 
drainage 
Good-
"Spot fires" 
burning in 
Dottom of 
West 
drainage 
-FBA-
"West Flank Group" 
working between 1450ft 
and 1880ft from Zero Pt. 
94 
16:00:00 16:02:00 16:04:00 16:05:00 16:06:0( ) 16:07:00 
-SCR-
"Fire" crosses west 
drainage at base of 
gully below 
Longanecker 
Doehring,Erickson,Brixey, 
Haugh-
"Fire" moving north up 
drainage 
Erickson.Hipke-
"Fire" active in bottom of ( 
West drainage south and ' 
below Lunch Spot. 1 
3ood,Ryerson-
'Fire" intensity 
ncreases 
Petrilli,Thomas,Shepard-
"Fire" runs up east facing 
slope in West 
drainage... moving north. 
Hipke,time:Putnam-
"Fire" on west bench 
north of Lunch spot."U" 
shaped front up both 
sides of drainage 
-Scholz-
Wind" blows from 
west at 45 mph 
-Petrilli-
"Wind" blows at 
35mph below Lunch Spot. 
Petrilli radios Mackey that 
fire has crossed main 
canyon. 
( 
Good.Ryerson-
Wind" blows from 
«est 
@45 mph 
)n Main ridge 
-Petrilli-
"Spot fire (1)" runs on East-
facing slope...35 yds. North 
of Double Draws 
-Shepard.Scholz-
"Spot Fire(2)" starts 
across West drainage 
below West Flank Group. 
Reported by Kelso...Schoiz 
"things are getting complicate J" 
Shepard.Scholz-
"West Flank Group" told by 
Shepard to "get out" 
1880 ft. from Zero Pt. 
95 
16:11:15 16:12:00 16:12:15 16:12:30 16:13:30 
Erickson,Archuleta,Time:Putnam-
"Fire" roars up to Main ridge 
south of Spur Ridge 
Time:Putnam -FBA-
"Fire" burns to base of 
spur ridge about to enter 
draw below "tree" 
Scholz-
"Fire" on south side of 
Spur Ridge crests Main 
ridge 150-200ft. South of 
Zero Pt. 
Time:Putnam-
Erickson,Haugh,Scholz,Robertson-
"Fire" crests spur ridge 
hot air, heat ©Zero Pt. 
TIME:Putnam -
FBA-
"Fire" burns over 
West Flank Group 
200-280 ft. from 
Zero Pt. 
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Time: Putnam -FBA-
"West Flank Group" stops 
@200ft. From Zero Pt. 
Leaders 
Thrash&Roth Depoy 
Shelters 
Time: Putnam -
FBA-
"West Flank 
Group" overrun by 
fire 200-280ft. 
from Zero Pt. 
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16:13:45 16:14:00 16:15:00 
Time:Putnam-
"Fire" overruns Blecha at 121 
ft. from Zero Pt. 
Hipke, time:Putnam-
"Fire" just about at Zero Pt. Hot air pushes 
down Hipke 15ft. From Zero Pt. 
Navarro,Scholz Byers.Ryerson, 
time:Putnam-
"Fire" near top of Main Ridge at H-2 
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TIME 300:00:00 5:28:00 08:00 to 09:00 9:30:00 10:27:00 
BLANCO 
-SCR-
"Blanco" with BLM/FS crew at 
Main ridge, begin making H-
2. Discusses strategy with 
Mackey. Listens to NOAA 
forecast with some jumpers. 
-SCR-
"Blanco" with Mackey,Tyler, 
and 93R recpns fire. Mackey 
calls jumpers on ground and 
instructs to build line down 
West flank. 
ERICKSON 
Erickson.SCR-
"Erickson" went to get gear at 
jump spot. 
-Erickson,SCR,FBA-
"Erickson" "thought it looked 
ugly down in there" when told 
to start digging line downhill 
RHOADES 
-Rhoades,OSHA-
"Rhodes" questions downhill line 
construction...Jumper'(2) load 
dropping 
JUMPERSd) 
-Rhoades.OSHA-
"Jumpers" talk about whole 
drainage burning out, move 
to jump site to gather gear. 
-SCR-
"Jumpers{1)" questions 
downhill line construction 
and requests discussion with 
Mackey...smoke low in west 
drainage 
JUMPERS(2) 
-SCR-
"Jumpers(2)" of 8 arrive...little 
wind...fire at 127 acres 
PRINEVILLE IHC(9) 
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16:04:00 16:05:00 16:06:00 16:07:00 16:08:00 16:08:30 16:08:40 16:10:00 16:10:30 
Scholz.Gray, SCR-
"Blanco" relays 
message about 
Spot fire across 
West drainage to 
Ryerson, Mackey 
Doehring, Erickson, 
Brixley, Haugh-
"Blanco" called by 
Haugh about Spot 
fire(2) across West 
drainage...says 
"get out" 
Erickson.Doehring-
"Erickson" with 
Doehring meet 
Archulta on west 
flank about 
450ft.and hear 
order to get out 
Erickson,Doehring, 
Haugh, Brixey-
"Erickson" 
Doehring, 
Archuleta at 
Tree... meet 
Haugh,Brixev,,. 
Haugh,Erickson,time:Putnam-
"Erickson"sees first of West 
Flank group crossing top of 
Spur Ridge. At Tree with 
Haugh 
FBA:Time:Putnam 
"Erickson" at Tree, 
sees West Flank 
Group as they cross 
Spur Ridge...yells at 
Group to go faster, 
calls Mackey about 
spot fire(2) below 
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16:10:45 16:11:00 16:11:15 16:12:00 16:12:15 16:12:30 16:13:30 16:13:45 16:14:00 16:15.00 
SCR.FBA-
"Blanco" radios 
Dispatch and says 
they are losing fire on 
side near homes(east 
side of west 
drainage)...requests 
retardent. 
Erickson,Archuleta 
Time:Putnam-
"Erickson" with 
Haugh start up 
fireline...Hipke at 
325ft. From Zero 
Pt. 
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TIME 3:00:00 5:28:00 08:00 to 09:00 9:30:00 10:27:00 11:15:00 11:30:00 11:35:00 
PRINEVIL LE IHC CREW 
MACKEY 
-SCR-
"Mackey" 
request 
Helicopter 
and fixed 
wing aircraft. 
-SCR-
"Mackey" takes 
recon flight in 
93R with 
Blanco, Tyler. 
Tells 
Jumpers(1) to 
dig line down 
West flank 
102 
12:30:00 12:45:00 13:00:00 
13:30:00 
PM 14:00 PM 
14:15 to 
14:30 14:45:00 15:00:00 15:10:00 15:15:00 15:20:00 
-OSHA.Haugh-
"Prineville" briefed 
on weather, frontal 
passage at 
helibase? 
-SCR-
"Prineville"(2n 
d group) 
arrive at H-
2..works on 
Main 
ridge...Longa 
necker leaves 
Lunch spot to 
scout line to 
South 
103 
12:30:00 12:45:00 13:00:00 
13:30:00 
PM 14:00 PM 
14:15 to 
14:30 14:45:00 15:00:00 15:10:00 15:15:00 15:20:00 
-OSHA.Haugh-
"Prineville" briefed 
on weather, frontal 
Dassage at 
helibase? 
-SCR-
"Prinevllle"(2n 
d group) 
arrive at H-
2..works on 
Main 
ridge... Longa 
necker leaves 
Lunch spot to 
scout line to 
South 
104 
15:23:00 15:30:00 15:45:00 15:55:00 15:56:00 15:58:00 16:00:00 16:02:00 16:04:00 16:05:00 
-SCR-
"Prineville"on 
main ridge 
directed to go to 
H-1 to safety 
zone. 
SCR,Erickson,Doehring_ 
"Mackey" sends 
Erickson.Doehring to 
hotspot Main ridge 
Petrilli-
"Mackey" called 
by Petrilli to 
report fire is 
35yds north of 
base of Double 
Draws. 
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16:06:00 16:07:00 16:08:00 16:08:30 16:08:40 16:10:00 16:10:30 16:10:45 16:11:00 16:11:15 16:12:00 
-Petrilli, 
Thomas,Shep 
ard-
"Mackey" 
meets 
Jumpers(2) 
10Oft. Below 
Lunch 
Spot,says to 
go up to H-1. 
Calls 
Longanecker 
ko check up. 
Longanecker,ti 
me:Putnam-
"Mackey" 
moves north 
toward West 
Flank Group 
after radioing 
Longanecker. 
Time:Putnam-
"Mackey" begins 
running north 
along West flank 
fireline at 1450ft. 
SCR-
"Mackey" 
catches up 
with West 
Flank Group. 
Erickson-
"Mackey" 
called by 
Erickson 
about spot 
fie below 
them 
106 
16:12:15 16:12:30 16:13:30 16:14:00 16:15:00 
Note: "Prineville IHC (9)" and "Mackey" during these time frames were in the process of being overtaken by the 
fire. 
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15:30:00 to 16:04 SCR 
Wind blows up to 35mph on Main 
Ridge 
0800-0900 
Rhoades,OS 
HA 
Jumpers (1) 
assemble 
gear at jump 
site... talk 
about entire 
drainage 
burning out 
11:15:00 to 11:35:00 
PetrilIi,Doehring 
Fire torches a "Tree" 
40yds. Below Main Ridge 
with 5ft. wide run through 
oak. 
13:00:00 SCR 
Fire flares up at a tree 
Firefighters retreat 400ft. but return 
when water drops effective, Cut 
tree becomes "Stump" 
16:00:00 SCR 
-• Fire crosses West drainage 
At base of gully below 
Longanecker 
09:30:00 SCR 
Jumpers(l,2) question 
tactics 
Blanco w/Mackey recon • 
fire and instruct 
Jumpers(2)to build 
fireline down West flank 
as thev arrive 
11:30:00 SCR 
Jumpers(l,2) start digging 
fireline down West 
flank.. .discuss pulling off at 
11:35 after torched tree. 
12:30:00 SCR 
Prineville(9) arrive at H-2, 
sent by Blanco and Shepard 
down West Flank. 
13:30:00 Scholz 
West Flank Group meets 
at "Stump" 
First time all together 
Prineville(9) joins 
Jumpers(l,2) 
14:00:00 to 
16:04:00 
SCR 
West Flank Group 
working between 
1440 ft, and 1880 ft. 
fi-om Zero Ft. Group 
east lunch at 1400 at 
Lunch Spot. 
Figure A.4 and Part 1 of final STEP Worksheet of South Canyon Fire accident sequence beginning at 0800 on July 6, 1994. Jumpers(l) are 
the first group of smokejumpers to arrive, Jumpers(2) the second. Zero Pt. is the location on the Main Ridge at the north end of the West 
Flank fireline where escape from the fire was possible. References to locations are defined in Appendix D and Butler and others (1998). 
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16:12:15(Putnam) 
FBA 
West Flank Group 
Stops at 200ft. 
from Zero Pt. 
Leaders Thrash 
and Roth 
deploy fire 
shelters 
16:02:00 Petrilli 
Wind blows at 35 
below Lunch Spot 
16:08:40 
Mackey joins West Flank Group 
Ran at 16:07 from Lunch Spot after 
meeting jumpers(l). Directs them 
to upper safety zone 
SCR 
West Flank 
Group 
ordered by Shepard 
to "get out" 
1880ft. from 
Zero Pt. 
16:04:00 
Shepard,Scholz 
Hot air and heat at Zero Pt. 
16:12:30(Putnam) 
Erickson,Haugh,Scholz,Robertson 
Fire crests Spur Ridge Fire moves north up 
drainage,Petrilli radios 
Mackey that fire crossed 
drainage 
16:02:00 
Doehring,Erickson,Brixey,Ha 
ugh 
Fire crests Main Ridge 
South of Spur Ridge 150-200ft. from 
Zero Pt. 
16:12:15(Putnam) FBA 
West Flank 
Group 
Fatally Burned 
16:13:30(Putnam) 
FBA 
Tern Pf 
200-280ft. from 
By Fire 
• West Flank 
Group (Mackey) radioed by 
Erickson about spot fire 
below them. 
16:10:30(Putnam) 
Erickson,FBA 
No response 
Part 2 of final STEP Worksheet showing continuation of South Canyon Fire accident sequence. (OSHA 1995, IMRT 1994, Butler and 
others 1998). Refer to Figure# for map of fire and relative locations of actors. 
APPENDIX B 
USDA Forest Service 
Documents 
Table B.l NWCG 10 Standard Firefighting Orders, 18 Watch-Out Situations, and 10 DownhiMndirect 
Line Construction Guidelines. 
STANDARD FIRE FIGHTING ORDERS 
1. FIGHT FIRE AGGRESSIVELY BUT PROVIDE FOR SAFETY HRST. 
2. INITIATE ALL ACTIONS BASED ON CURRENT AND EXPECTED FIRE BEHAVIOR. 
3. RECOGNIZE CURRENT WEATHER CONDITIONS AND OBTAIN FORECASTS. 
4. ENSURE INSTRUCTIONS ARE GIVEN AND UNDERSTOOD. 
5. OBTAIN CURRENT INFORMATION ON HRE STATUS. 
6. REMAIN IN COMMUNICATION WITH CREW MEMBERS, YOUR SUPERVISOR, AND 
ADJOINING FORCES. 
7. DETERMINE SAFETY ZONES AND ESCAPE ROUTES. 
8. ESTABLISH LOOKOUTS IN POTENTIALLY HAZARDOUS SITUATIONS. 
9. RETAIN CONTROL AT ALL TIMES. 
10. STAY ALERT, KEEP CALM, THINK CLEARLY, ACT DECISIVELY. 
18 SITUATIONS THAT SHOUT WATCH-OUT 
1. FIRE NOT SCOUTED OR SIZED UP. 
2. IN COUNTRY NOT SEEN IN DAYLIGHT. 
3. SAFETY ZONES AND ESCAPE ROUTES NOT IDENTIFIED. 
4. UNFAMILL\R WITH WEATHER AND LOCAL FACTORS INFLUENCING FIRE BEHAVIOR. 
5. UNIFORMED ON STRATEGY, TACTICS, AND HAZARDS. 
6. INSTRUCTIONS AND ASSIGNMENTS NOT CLEAR. 
7. NO COMMUNICATION LINK WITH CREW MEMBERS/SUPERVISOR. 
8. CONSTRUCTING FIRELINE WITHOUT SAFE ANCHOR POINT. 
9. BUILDING FIRELINE DOWNHILL WITH FIRE BELOW. 
10. ATTEMPTING FRONTAL ASSAULT ON FIRE. 
11. UNBURNED FUEL BETWEEN YOU AND THE HRE. 
12. CANNOT SEE MAIN HRE, NOT IN CONTACT WITH ANYONE WHO CAN. 
13. ON A HILLSIDE WHERE ROLLING MATERL\L CAN IGNITE FUEL BELOW. 
14. WEATHER IS GETTING HOTTER AND DRIER. 
15. WIND INCREASES AMD/OR CHANGES DIRECTION. 
16. GETTING FREQUENT SPOT HRES ACROSS LINE. 
17. TERRAIN AND FUELS MAKE ESCAPE TO SAFETY ZONES DIFFICULT. 
18. TAKING A NAP NEAR THE FIRELINE. 
DOWNHILL/INDIRECT LINE CONSTRUCTION GUIDELINES 
1. THE DECISION IS MADE BY A COMPETENT RREFIGHTER AFTER THOROUGH 
SCOUTING. 
2. DOWNHILL LINE CONSTRUCTION SHOULD NOT BE ATTEMPTED WHEN FIRE IS 
PRESENT DIRECTLY BELOW THE PROPOSED STARTING POINT. 
3. THE FIRELINE SHOULD NOT BE IN OR ADJACENT TO A CHIMNEY OR CHUTE THAT 
COULD BURN OUT WHILE THE CREW IS IN THE VICINITY. 
4. COMMUNICATIONS IS ESTABLISHED BETWEEN THE CREW WORKING DOWNHILL AND 
CREWS WORKING TOWARD THEM FROM BELOW. WHEN NEITHER CREW CAN 
ADEQUATELY OBSERVE THE FIRE, COMMUNICATIONS WILL BE ESTABLISHED 
BETWEEN THE CREWS, SUPERVISING OVERHEAD, AND A LOOKOUT POSTED WHERE 
THE HRE'S BEHAVIOR CAN BE CONTINUOUSLY OBSERVED. 
5. THE CREW WILL BE ABLE TO RAPIDLY REACH A ZONE OF SAFETY FROM ANY POINT 
ALONG THE LINE IF THE FIRE UNEXPECTEDLY CROSSES BELOW THEM. 
I l l  
6. A DOWNHILL LINE SHOULD BE SECURELY ANCHORED AT THE TOP. AVOID 
UNDERSLUNG LINE IF AT ALL PRACTICAL. 
7. LINE FIRING SHOULD BE DONE AS THE LINE PROGRESSES, BEGINNING FROM THE 
ANCHOR POINT AT THE TOP. THE BURNED OUT AREA PROVIDES A CONTINUOUS 
SAFETY ZONE FOR THE CREW AND REDUCES THE LIKELIHOOD OF FIRE CROSSING THE 
LINE. 
8. BE AWARE OF AND AVOID THE "18" SITUATIONS THAT SHOUT WATCH OUT!" 
9. FULL COMPLIANCE WITH "THE 10 STANDARD HRE ORDERS" IS ASSURED. 
SOURCE: FIRELINE HANDBOOK PMS 410-01, NATIONAL WILDFIRE COORDINATING 
GROUP. NFES 0065. 
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Table B.2. NWCG Wildland Firefighter Entrapment Matrix. 
ENTRAPMENT INVESTIGATION EUEMENT MATRIX 
L FIRE BEHAVIOR 
Fuels 
Weadier 
Topography 
Predicied vs. Observed 
IL ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS 
Smoke 
Heat 
Other 
m. INCIDENT MANAGEMENT 
Incident Objectives 
Stmegy 
Tactics 
Safety Bnefiniip/Majta: Coxiceras 
Addzessed 
IV. CONTROL MECHANISMS 
Span of Contnl 
CoTnTniinicatioas 
Ongoii^ Evaluadois 
"10 Standard File Oxdeis/18 Watdi-
OHt Situations.'' 
V. INVOLVED PERSONNEL PROFH-ES 
Traiaiag^QiiaiillcaiiflTK/Physical Fitness 
Opeiatioiial Peziod Leagth/Fatigae 
Attitudes 
Leadership 
Experience Levels 
VI. EQUIPMENT 
Availability 
PcrAmnance 
* Element items must be supported with wriaea docuttaauation. n 
1 
j 
i 
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